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TITLE VII AND HOMOSEXUAL HARASSMENT AFTER ONCALE:
WAS IT A VICTORY?
MARY COOMBS*
In the paradigmatic Title VII case,1 the harasser is male and his target is fe-
male, and that gender constellation is relevant in assessing the claim.2  Increas-
ingly in recent years, however, cases have arisen which do not fit the paradigm.
Instead, these new cases involve individuals of the same sex.3  Sometimes, the
cases involve situations where all of the parties are heterosexual men, but the
plaintiff is disturbed by the sexualized forms of harassment used against him.  In
some of the cases, the plaintiff is, or at least is perceived as, gay or insufficiently
masculine and is apparently targeted because of those perceptions.  In other
cases, the defendant is, or is perceived as, gay and thus, the harassing behavior
is seen as a form of unwanted sexual demand.4  Previously, courts, faced with
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1. Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (1994) provides in relevant part:
It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer . . .  to fail or refuse to hire or
to discharge any individual, or otherwise to discriminate against any individual with re-
spect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such
individual’s race, color, religion, sex or national origin.
2. As the language of Title VII, which forms the statutory basis for federal sexual harassment
claims, indicates, the cause of action must show harassment because of sex.  The early recognition of
the cause of action reflected the work of feminist scholars such as Catharine MacKinnon. See
CATHARINE A. MACKINNON, SEXUAL HARASSMENT OF WORKING WOMEN (1979).  It remains true that
“[t]he prevailing paradigm defines unwanted heterosexual sexual advances as the core conduct that
constitutes sex-based harassment. The quintessential case of harassment involves a . . . male super-
visor [and]  . . .  a female subordinate.” Vicki Schultz, Reconceptualizing Sexual Harassment, 107 YALE
L.J. 1683, 1692 (1998).
3. Corey Taylor, Comment, Same-Sex Sexual Harassment in the Workplace Under Title VII: The
Legal Dilemma and the Tenth Circuit Solution, 46 KAN. L. REV. 305 (1998).  Examples of such recent
same-sex cases include Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Service, Inc., 118 S. Ct. 998 (1998), Doe v. City of
Belleville, 119 F.3d 563 (7th Cir. 1997), vacated and remanded by Oncale, 118 S. Ct. 1183 (1998), and
McWilliams v. Fairfax County Board of Supervisors, 72 F.3d 1191 (4th Cir. 1996). These cases were al-
most all decided in the last few years.
The case of a male plaintiff charging harassment by a female supervisor or co-worker is also
distinguishable from the paradigm and problematic under some interpretations of Title VII.  Most of
those doctrinal puzzles, however, are comprised within an analysis of same-sex harassment claims,
and any issues particular to the female-to-male harassment question are beyond the scope of this
article.
4. Formally, the gender of the parties is irrelevant.  A case involving two women is conceptu-
ally identical to a case involving two men, just as a case involving a male harasser and a female tar-
get is conceptually the same as one involving a female harasser and a male target.  In reality, gender
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these varieties of same sex sexual harassment claims, took a wide range of doc-
trinal positions on the viability of the cause of action.
In 1998, the Supreme Court provided a modicum of resolution for these is-
sues.  In Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Services, Inc.,5 a unanimous Supreme Court
rejected the argument that Title VII did not apply, as a matter of law, when the
harasser and the harassed employee were of the same sex.  Rather, it held, the
plaintiff must prove that “the conduct at issue . . . constituted
‘discrimina[tion] . . . because of . . .  sex,’” as well as satisfying the other doctrinal
requirements of a sexual harassment claim.6  If he could do so in a same-sex
context, then he was entitled to relief.7  Oncale, however, did not settle the ques-
tion of what evidence would establish that same-sex harassment was “because of
sex.”8
This article focuses on one particular type of same-sex sexual harassment
case after Oncale, namely those in which a male employee allegedly harasses a
male subordinate or coworker because of his sexual desire for the plaintiff.9  The
easy assumption that these cases are simply gender-variants of the standard
male harasser/female target situation significantly oversimplifies how such
cases are likely to be litigated and decided. If the theory and practice of such
cases is not carefully examined and developed, gay workers may well find that
Oncale has made them more, rather than less, vulnerable in the workplace.
Part I canvasses the historical terrain by summarizing the case law prior to
Oncale, examining what Oncale decided, and determining what issues it left un-
resolved.  It also briefly describes the theoretical approaches to same-sex har-
assment in prior academic commentary.  Part II examines the gay harasser case
as it is likely to be analyzed under the existing doctrinal structure10 and focuses
on the questions: (1) whether the harassment is “because of . . . sex;”11 (2)
itself matters.  In the remainder of this article, I use male pronouns when discussing same-sex har-
assment in general, both because the language will get excessively complicated and because the
bulk of the same-sex cases involve male parties.
5. 118 S. Ct. 998, 1003 (1998).
6. Id.  The elements of a claim are explicated in text accompanying note 80.
7. See infra text accompanying notes 36-54.  In effect, Oncale told us what the law was not, but
did very little to tell us what the law is.  See id.
8. Infra text accompanying notes 115-21.
9. In contrast, most of the prior commentary on same-sex harassment has focused on the vari-
ant in which heterosexual men harass other men because of their perceived homosexuality or other
forms of gender non-conformity. See, e.g., Kathryn Abrams, The New Jurisprudence of Sexual Harass-
ment, 83 CORNELL L. REV. 1169 (1998) [hereinafter Abrams, New Jurisprudence]; Katharine Franke,
What’s Wrong With Sexual Harassment?, 49 STAN. L. REV. 691 (1997); Pamela J. Papish, Homosexual
Harassment or Heterosexual Horseplay? The False Dichotomy of Same-Sex Sexual Harassment Law, 28
COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 201 (1996).
10. See Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc., 510 U.S. 17 (1993); Henson v. City of Dundee, 682 F.2d 897,
903 (11th Cir. 1982).  There are two forms of actionable sexual harassment.  In quid pro quo cases, a
supervisor demands sexual favors, using the threat of negative workplace consequences or the
promise of workplace reward to obtain compliance.  In “hostile environment” cases, a supervisor
and/or co-workers engage in conduct that is “sufficiently severe or pervasive to alter the conditions
of employment and create an abusive working environment.”  Henson, 682 F.2d at 904. This doc-
trinal structure was laid out by the EEOC in its Guidelines, 29 C.F.R. § 1604.11(a) (1981), and ap-
proved by the Supreme Court in Meritor Savings Bank, F.S.B. v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57 (1986).
11. See supra text accompanying notes 84-122.
COOMBSMACRO4.DOC 06/28/99  11:44 AM
TITLE VII AND HOMOSEXUAL HARASSMENT AFTER ONCALE 115
whether the harassment is sufficiently “severe and pervasive,” including the
question of whose perspective the courts are to use in making that judgment;12
and (3) whether the harassing conduct was sufficiently “unwelcome” to be ac-
tionable.13  Part III considers what impact a cause of action for same-sex sexual
harassment may have on employees who are, or are perceived to be, gay.  Fi-
nally, in Part IV, I propose a short-term solution for minimizing the unjust risks
associated with a same-sex cause of action under existing Title VII doctrine.  In
addition, I suggest that this problem provides still another demonstration of the
need for a long-term, probably legislative, reconceptualization of the legal ap-
proach to sexual harassment in the workplace.
I. THE BACKGROUND
A. The Judicial History of  Same Sex Harassment Law
As Justice Scalia noted in Oncale, “the state and federal courts [had] taken a
bewildering variety of stances” on the applicability of Title VII to sexual harass-
ment between persons of the same sex.14  Nonetheless, almost all of the prior
cases fit within one of three broad categories: cases holding that there could
never be a cause of action for same-sex harassment; cases allowing the cause of
action only when the harasser was shown to be homosexual; and cases permit-
ting a cause of action in at least some situations regardless of the sexual orienta-
tion of the parties.
1. Same Sex Never Actionable
The leading case holding that same-sex harassment is never actionable was
Goluszek v. Smith.15  In that case, a male plaintiff sued under Title VII claiming
that he had been subjected to a hostile work environment.16 Although the alleged
harassment would clearly have been sufficient to defeat a motion to dismiss in
the normal cross-gender paradigm, the court dismissed the claim because
Goluszek was a man.  It held, in effect, that Title VII was intended to protect
from the misuse of power “against a discrete and vulnerable group.”17 Since the
court could not conceive of how actions by men directed against another man
could reflect an anti-male animus, it found Goluzsek’s claim outside the scope of
12. See supra text accompanying notes 123-71.  This issue is frequently characterized in the lit-
erature as whether severity should be judged from the perspective of a “reasonable person” or from
a more subjective viewpoint, such as that of the “reasonable woman.”
13. See supra text accompanying notes 172-203.
14. 118 S. Ct. 998, 1002 (1998).
15. 697 F. Supp. 1452 (N.D. Ill. 1988).
16. In Goluszek, the plaintiff was shy and sexually inexperienced.  His coworkers repeatedly
harassed him by asking if he had engaged in sexual activity, showing him pictures of nude women,
poking his buttocks with a stick and telling him he should “get married and get some of that soft
pink smelly stuff that’s between the legs of a woman.”  Id. at 1453-54.  The employer did little in re-
sponse to Goluszek’s complaints. See id. at 1454.
17. Id. at 1456.  The Goluszek Court relied on a Harvard Law Review note in its construction of
the statute; there was no other evidence of the asserted intention of Congress.  See Note, Sexual Har-
assment Claims of Abusive Work Environment Under Title VII,  97 HARV. L. REV. 1449, 1451-52 (1984).
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Title VII.18  Under the Goluszek approach, the sexual orientation of the parties is
irrelevant; if both parties are of the same sex, the court will dismiss the claim.19
2. Same-Sex Actionable Only When the Harasser is Homosexual
Courts in the second category permit a cause of action if, but only if, the
harasser’s behavior can be attributed to his homosexual sexual orientation.  A
gay male-to-male quid pro quo case, for example, seems conceptually identical
to the classically actionable situation of a quid pro quo demand by a heterosex-
ual supervisor toward a different-sex subordinate.20
This approach has been adopted where the homosexual defendants alleg-
edly engaged in hostile environment same-sex sexual harassment.  The Fourth
Circuit, for example, had held in McWilliams v. Fairfax County Board of Supervi-
sors21 that there was no cause of action “where both the alleged harassers and the
victim are heterosexuals of the same sex,”22 since it was a matter of “common
understanding” that such behavior was not “‘because of’ the victim’s sex.”23  In
Wrightson v. Pizza Hut of America, Inc.,24 a case involving harassment by a super-
visor and coworkers who were openly gay, the Fourth Circuit distinguished
McWilliams and held that the plaintiff could attempt to establish that the homo-
sexual defendants harassed him because he was male.25
These cases assume that the gay male perpetrator situation parallels the
male perpetrator/female target situation because the plaintiff would not have
been subjected to harassment had he or she been of a different sex. These courts
18. See Goluszek, 697 F. Supp. at 1456.  The Fifth Circuit subsequently adopted the Goluszek ap-
proach in Garcia v. Elf Atochem North America, 83 F.3d 118 (5th Cir. 1994) and followed it in Oncale v.
Sundowner Offshore Services, Inc., 83 F.3d 118 (5th Cir. 1996), rev’d 118 S. Ct. 998 (1998).  See also Ash-
worth v. Roundup Co., 897 F. Supp. 489 (W.D. Wash. 1995) (following the Goluszek approach); Mayo
v. Kiwest Corp., 898 F. Supp. 334 (E.D. Va. 1995) (same); Polly v. Houston Lighting & Power Co.,
803 F. Supp. 1 (S.D. Tex. 1992) (same).
19. While cases following the Goluszek rule seem generally to have involved heterosexual har-
assers, the rule was also followed in Torres v. National Precision Blanking, 943 F. Supp. 952 (N.D. Ill.
1996), a case involving a supervisor who engaged in unwanted sexual touching, sexually explicit
and degrading remarks, and demands for sexual favors that held that “same-gender sexual harass-
ment does not and cannot occur, as a matter of law, ‘because of’ the victim’s ‘sex.’”  See also Schoiber
v. Emro Marketing Co., 941 F. Supp. 730 (N.D. Ill. 1996) (determining that victim does not have to
be of the opposite sex of the harasser for there to be sexual harassment).
20. See Yeary v. Goodwill Industries-Knoxville, Inc., 107 F.3d 443, 447-48 (6th Cir. 1997)
(willing to recognize a cause of action in a quid pro quo case, in which a supervisor makes sexual
demands on a same-sex subordinate); see also Fredette v. BVP Management Assocs., 112 F.3d 1503,
1506 (11th Cir. 1997).
21. 72 F.3d 1191, 1195 (4th Cir. 1996).
22. Id.
23. Id. at 1196. The court never explained why the sexual orientation of the plaintiff mattered
under this analysis.
24. 99 F.3d 138, 141 (4th Cir. 1996). The alleged harassment “took the form of sexual advances,
in which [a defendant] graphically described homosexual sex to Wrightson in an effort to pressure
Wrightson into engaging in homosexual sex.” Id. at 139.  Apparently because there were no threats
or promises attached to these advances, however, the claim was couched as one for hostile envi-
ronment rather than quid pro quo harassment.
25. Id. at 143-44. While not all harassment of a male by homosexual males would be actionable,
it was sufficient that the plaintiff’s sex was part of the motivation for the behavior.  See id. at 144
(citing Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228 (1989)).
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reject the Goluzsek approach and extend Title VII to homosexual same-sex har-
assment in part from a concern that homosexual harassers will otherwise be
given a “free pass,” thus “effectively ‘exempt[ing] homosexuals from the very
laws that govern the workplace conduct of heterosexuals.’”26  Their arguments
for limiting same-sex harassment to homosexual defendants are based either on
a failure to comprehend the bases for actionable sexual harassment other than
lust27 or a concern that the broader alternative would open the floodgates and
turn Title VII into a general civility code.28
3. Same Sex Can Be Actionable Regardless of the Parties’ Sexual
Orientation
Courts adopting the third approach permit same-sex harassment cases to
proceed regardless of the sexual orientation of the parties.  Cases in this category
focus upon the sexual nature of the behavior, or the gendered way in which it is
experienced, rather than upon whether gender or sexuality are crucial to the
harasser’s motivation.29  In Quick v. Donaldson, 30  an Eighth Circuit case involving
numerous incidents of “bagging,”31 the court reversed a summary judgment for
the defendants. It rejected the trial court’s adoption of the Goluzsek analysis,
stating that Title VII did not require any showing that the behavior was moti-
vated by an anti-male animus32 and held that it was sufficient to show that hos-
tile behavior of a sexual nature was targeted primarily at members of one gen-
der.33
This approach provides several benefits. It allows a cause of action when a
harasser targets a person because of his or her sex for reasons of animus, a form
of sexual harassment unrelated to the actor’s sexual orientation.  It also avoids
the difficulties created by the second approach of litigating and judicially deter-
mining people’s sexual orientation,34 an issue that a court should not be required
to decide.35
26. Caldwell v. KFC Corp., 958 F. Supp. 962, 969 (D.N.J. 1997) (quoting Pritchett v. Sizeler Real
Estate Management Co., Inc., No. CIV.A. 93-2351, 1995 WL 241855, at *2 (E.D. La. Apr. 25, 1995)).
27. See Schultz, supra note 2 at 1774-82.
28. See McWilliams, 72 F.3d at 1196; cf. Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Servs. Inc., 118 S. Ct.
998, 1002 (1998) (rejecting this argument).
29. See, e.g., Doe v. City of Belleville, 119 F.3d 563 (7th Cir. 1997), vacated and remanded by On-
cale v. Sundowner Offshore Servs. Inc., 118 S. Ct. 1183 (1998).
30. 90 F.3d 1372 (8th Cir. 1996).
31. Bagging is the actual or threatened grabbing and squeezing of a male’s testicles.
32. See Quick, 90 F.3d at 1378, rev’g Quick v. Donaldson, 895 F. Supp. 1288 (S.D. Iowa 1996).
33. See id. This approach, in which harassment is actionable regardless of the sex of the parties
so long as it involves differential treatment based on sex, is also the one taken by the EEOC in its
proposed guidelines on sexual harassment.  See EEOC Compl. Man. (CCH) § 615.2(b)(3) (1987)
(“The victim does not have to be of the opposite sex from the harasser.  Since sexual harassment is a
form of sex discrimination, the crucial inquiry is whether the harasser treats a member or members
of one sex differently from members of the other sex. The victim and the harasser may be of the
same sex where for instance, the sexual harassment is based on the victim’s sex (not on the victim’s
sexual preference) and the harasser does not treat employees of the opposite sex the same way.”).
34. See, e.g., Miller v. Vesta Inc., 946 F. Supp. 697, 705 (E.D. Wis. 1996) (stating that a cause of
action lies where a person discriminates based on dislike of the plaintiff’s gender without any ele-
ment of sexual desire).
35. See Doe v. City of Belleville, 119 F.3d 563, 589 (7th Cir. 1997) (noting the “appalling discov-
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4. Oncale Resolves the Conflict
In Oncale, a male plaintiff in an all-male workplace was, in the carefully
discreet language of the Supreme Court, “forcibly subjected to sex-related hu-
miliating actions . . .  physically assaulted . . . in a sexual manner, and . . . threat-
ened . . . with rape.”36  The lower courts, consistent with Fifth Circuit precedent,37
granted the defendants’ motion to dismiss. The Supreme Court reversed and
held that “nothing in Title VII necessarily bars a claim of discrimination ‘because
of . . . sex’ merely because the plaintiff and the defendant . . . are of the same
sex.”38
Oncale thus firmly rejected the Goluszek approach.  It also rejected the sec-
ond, McWilliams, approach. While it indicated that one means of showing that
the harassment was because of sex would be by providing evidence that Oncale’s
tormentors were gay, it then noted that “harassing conduct need not be moti-
vated by sexual desire to support an inference of discrimination on the basis of
sex.”39  Oncale in essence adopts the third approach, recognizing that a cause of
action can exist for same-sex sexual harassment by heterosexual as well as ho-
mosexual harassers.
The Court specifically rejected the defendant’s argument that the cause of
action should be narrowed to avoid turning Title VII into ‘a general civility code’
forbidding all sexualized workplace speech or action.40 In same-sex, as in differ-
ent sex contexts, the dangers of such overreaching were protected against by two
aspects of existing doctrine.
First, the harassment must be because of sex.  It is not sufficient for a sexual
harassment claimant merely to show that “the words used have sexual content
or connotations.”41  The inference of discrimination is “easy to draw” when a
male harasser targets a female, the Court says, because the conduct “typically
involves explicit or implicit proposals of sexual activity;” and the same inference
is available where there is “credible evidence that the harasser was homosex-
ery issues” if the requisite sexual orientation of the harasser were a legal precondition to suit); see
also, Ryczek v. Guest Services, Inc., 877 F. Supp. 754, 762 (D.D.C. 1995). This unseemly task could, of
course, also be avoided by the Goluszek approach. Cf. Torres v. National Precision Blanking, 943 F.
Supp. 952, 960 (N.D. Ill. 1996) (“[S]ame-gender sexual harassment, as opposed to typical gender dis-
crimination, cannot be wholly separated from sexual orientation, preference, identification, and af-
fectation [sic]. In order to allow same-gender sexual harassment actionability, federal courts would
be required to delve into the gyttja [sic] of subjective psychological analysis in litigation.”)  The Tor-
res court concluded that this provided additional support for excluding all same-sex harassment
from the scope of Title VII. See id. at 961.
36. Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Servs. Inc., 118 S. Ct. 998, 1001 (1998).
37. See Garcia v. Elf Atochem North America, 83 F.3d 118 (5th Cir. 1996).
38. Oncale, 118 S. Ct. at 1001-2. Unsurprisingly, the opinion written by Justice Scalia focused on
the language of Title VII, which does not include any limitation based on the gender patterns of
harasser and target.  Scalia noted that “statutory prohibitions often go beyond the principal evil to
cover reasonably comparable evils, and it is ultimately the provisions of our laws rather than the
principal concerns of our legislators by which we are governed.” Id. at 1002. On Justice Scalia’s tex-
tualist jurisprudence, see generally Antonin Scalia, A MATTER OF INTERPRETATION (1997).
39. Oncale, 118 S. Ct. at 1002.
40. See id.
41. See id. (quoting Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc., 510 U.S. 17, 25 (1993)) (“The critical issue . . . is
whether members of one sex are exposed to disadvantageous terms or conditions of employment to
which members of the other sex are not exposed.”).
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ual.”42  When the parties are the same sex, and no such evidence exists, other
forms of evidence are necessary to show that the harassment was because of sex.
These might include evidence that members of the other sex are in fact treated
better by this defendant or direct evidence that the harassment reflects general
hostility to the workplace presence of members of the plaintiff’s sex.43
Second, the conduct must be sufficiently severe or pervasive to create an
objectively hostile work environment.  Thus, “ordinary socializing in the work-
place—such as male-on-male horseplay or intersexual flirtation” is not action-
able.44 The Court emphasized the objective aspect of this test and insisted that
common sense, and an appropriate sensitivity to social context, will enable
courts and juries to distinguish between simple teasing or roughhousing among
members of the same sex, and conduct which a reasonable person in the plain-
tiff’s position would find severely hostile or abusive.45
The Court thus adopted a test that is inherently complex and multi-
factored.  It gave some examples of ways in which one could prove discrimina-
tion, but made clear that these are only examples.46  It reiterated that the abuse
must be objectively severe, as judged “from the perspective of a reasonable per-
son in plaintiff’s position, considering ‘all the circumstances.’”47  This test, how-
ever, is no more determinative than it was when previously announced in Harris
v. Forklift Systems, Inc.48
There is only a single hint of what the Supreme Court understands its deci-
sion in Oncale to entail.  Shortly after that decision was announced, the Court va-
cated and remanded Doe v. City of Belleville for reconsideration in light of On-
cale.49  This suggests that the Supreme Court thinks that the Seventh Circuit’s
approach in Doe is not entirely consistent with its own.  The Doe court, on facts
similar to those of Oncale,50 had provided two distinct rationales for finding that
42. Id.
43. See id.
44. Id. at 1003.
45. Id.  The Court noted the difference between a coach’s smack on the buttocks of a profes-
sional football player and the same smack upon the buttocks of the coach’s (male or female) secre-
tary as an example of the way in which the question of severity and pervasiveness were inflected by
social context.
46. See id. at 1002.
47. Id. at 1003 (quoting Harris, 510 U.S. at 23).
48. 510 U.S. 17 (1993).  As Justice Scalia pointed out in his concurrence in Harris, “[t]oday’s
opinion does list a number of factors that contribute to abusiveness . . . but since it neither says how
much of each is necessary (an impossible task) nor identifies any single factor as determinative, it
thereby adds little certitude.  As a practical matter, today’s holding lets virtually unguided juries
decide whether sex-related conduct engaged in (or permitted by) an employer is egregious enough
to warrant an award of damages.” Id. at 24.
49. See City of Belleville v. Doe, 118 S. Ct. 1183 (1998).
50. In both Doe and Oncale, the harassers are heterosexual, although the facts alleged in Doe
clearly suggest that at least one of the plaintiffs was targeted because of his gender nonconformity.
The Doe plaintiffs were two teenage brothers working during the summer in an all-male crew as-
signed to do lawn and garden work in the municipal cemetery. One of the brothers wore an earring
and the harassment included explicit questioning of his gender and his sexual orientation. See Doe,
119 F.3d at 566-67.  In the posture in which Oncale arose, there had been no fact-finding regarding
the reasons for targeting the plaintiff.
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Doe could show, as required by Title VII, that he was harassed “because of . . .
sex.”  First, the court suggested that the requirement would be met simply by
showing that “the harassment has explicit sexual overtones.”51 Alternatively, the
court suggested that the harassment would constitute sex discrimination if the
plaintiff were singled out because he did not fit his coworkers’ criteria for ap-
propriate masculinity.52
Based on the Supreme Court’s decision to remand, it is plausible to infer
that the Supreme Court disagrees with at least one of these rationales. The first
seems most vulnerable, for it is hard to distinguish between the “explicit sexual
overtones” found sufficient in Doe and the “offensive sexual connotations”
found insufficient in Oncale.53  This inconsistency is surely sufficient to explain
the remand of Doe. It is, therefore, entirely unclear what the Supreme Court
thought—or, to be more pragmatic, will likely think—about the second Doe ra-
tionale, holding that attacks on gender nonconformity form an appropriate basis
to meet the “because of sex” requirement for actionable sexual harassment.54
B. The Scholarship of Same-Sex Harassment
After the courts recognized a cause of action for sexual harassment under
Title VII, relevant scholarship first focused on the scope of the claim and the
questions of evidence, proof and doctrinal rules.55  More recently, there has been
a re-examination of the underlying theoretical justifications. This newer litera-
ture seems partly inspired by, and an attempt to grapple with, the increasing
prevalence of same sex sexual harassment claims.56  To decide if such claims fall
within Title VII requires understanding the relationship between the harm
caused by such behaviors and those harms forbidden by the statute.  That analy-
sis, in turn, requires a comprehensive understanding of the statute’s purposes.
Commentators have suggested three different approaches to the question
“why is sexual harassment actionable under Title VII?”57  First, sexual harass-
ment is illegal under Title VII because it is a form of differential treatment of in-
51. See Doe, 119 F.3d at 576.  Note that under this approach, the motivation of the harasser is
irrelevant.
52. See id. at 580.
53. Cf. Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Servs. Inc., 118 S. Ct. 998, 1002; Doe, 119 F.3d at 576.
54. This article focuses on cases unlike either Doe or Oncale, in which the harasser is (or is per-
ceived to be) gay.  Other academic literature has focused on the appropriate response to cases factu-
ally similar to these two.  That is, whether when heterosexual men harass a man they perceive as
effeminate it is to be viewed as discrimination on the basis of gender presentation and therefore “sex
discrimination” or discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation and therefore outside the protec-
tion of Title VII. See, e.g., Franke, supra note 9; Samuel A. Marcosson, Harassment on the Basis of Sex-
ual Orientation: A Claim of Sex Discrimination Under Title VII, 81 GEO. L.J. 1 (1992).  Professors Franke
and Marcosson both recognize that these two ways of viewing the same factual situation are diffi-
cult to separate because of the conflation in Euro-American law among sex, gender and sexual ori-
entation. Franke, supra, note 9 at 762-71; Marcosson, supra, at 6, 11-28.  See generally Francisco Val-
des, Queers, Sissies, Dykes, and Tomboys: Deconstructing the Conflation of “Sex,” “Gender,” and “Sexual
Orientation” in Euro-American Law and Society, 83 CAL. L. REV. 1 (1995).
55. See Abrams, New Jurisprudence, supra note 9, at 1170-71.
56. See, e.g., id.; Franke, supra note 9; Schultz, supra note 2.
57. See Franke, supra note 9, at 691.
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dividuals, male or female, because of their gender.58  This approach embodies
the formal equality theory of feminism and is apparent in the earliest cases ac-
cepting the cause of action.59  In effect, it asks the counter-factual question,
“[w]ould the complaining employee have suffered the harassment had he or she
been of a different gender?”60  If not, the harassment was “because of . . . sex.”
Under this approach, the unwanted, sexualized, harassing behavior forced upon
one man by another because of the perpetrator’s sexual desire for the other is
readily seen as actionable.61  Conversely, such behavior directed at a male plain-
tiff by heterosexual men would be far harder to characterize as sex-
discrimination.62  Some commentators see these implications of the equality ap-
proach as a reason for rejecting the theory, at least as the sole rationale for liabil-
ity under Title VII.63  Others seek to expand the notion of individual differential
treatment to reach at least some forms of heterosexual same-sex harassment.64
Applying the same rationale used to extend marriage rights to same-sex couples
in Baehr v. Lewin,65 they argue that harassment of gay plaintiffs is sex discrimina-
tion.  In effect, the argument is that Title VII, by banning sex discrimination in
employment, logically bans sexual orientation discrimination as well, whatever
Congress may have thought it was doing.66  The argument retains the structure
of the formal equality approach, while expanding its content to bring more ac-
tions under the rubric of “because of . . . sex.”
58. See Kathryn Abrams, Title VII and the Complex Female Subject, 92 MICH. L. REV. 2479 (1994)
(discussing this approach as a variant of the equality or sameness branch of feminist legal theory)
[hereinafter Abrams, Complex Female Subject]; see also MACKINNON, supra note 2 (criticizing this the-
ory in the early stages of the development of sexual harassment law).
59. See, e.g., Barnes v. Costle, 561 F.2d 983 (D.C. Cir. 1977); Tomkins v. Pub. Serv. Elec. & Gas
Co., 568 F.2d 1044 (3rd Cir. 1977).
60. Bundy v. Jackson, 641 F.2d 934, 942 n.7 (D.C. Cir. 1981) (stating that this question is one of
but-for causation).
61. See, e.g., EEOC v. Walden Book Co., 885 F. Supp. 1100 (M.D. Tenn. 1995); Wright v. Meth-
odist Youth Servs., 511 F. Supp. 307 (N.D. Ill. 1981); Charles R. Calleros, The Meaning of ‘Sex’: Homo-
sexual and Bisexual Harassment under Title VII, 20 VT. L. REV. 55, 64-65 (1995) (noting how readily
harassment by gay men is included under such an interpretation).  Calleros then argues that har-
assment by a heterosexual man is analytically indistinguishable “[s]o long as the supervisor selec-
tively abuses members of his own gender because of their gender.” Id. at 64-65.
62. Some courts suggest that it is the target’s shyness or other individual vulnerability or the
actor’s vulgarity or perversity, rather than the target’s gender, which explains the behavior, and
thus that it is not discrimination “because of . . . sex” as required for Title VII liability.  See McWil-
liams v. Fairfax County Bd. of Supervisors, 72 F.3d 1191, 1196 (4th Cir. 1996).
63. See, e.g., Franke, supra note 9; Carolyn Grose, Same-Sex Sexual Harassment: Subverting the
Heterosexist Paradigm of Title VII, 7 YALE J. L. & FEMINISM 375 (1995).
64. See, e.g., Andrew Koppelman, Why Discrimination Against Lesbians and Gay Men Is Sex Dis-
crimination, 69 N.Y.U. L. REV. 197 (1994); Marcosson, supra note 54.
65. 852 P.2d 44 (Haw. 1993). As an example of this rationale consider the following.  An em-
ployer discriminates against John, or permits other employees to harass John because he sleeps with
men.  They would not behave in the same way toward Sally because she sleeps with men.  Thus,
John is treated differently from the counter-factual Sally because he is a man.
66. If Marcosson or Koppelman are persuasive, it is because of their theoretical arguments for
why discrimination against gay men and lesbians reflects and reinforces gender role restrictions and
not because of linguistic sleight-of-hand.  See generally Mary Anne Case, Disaggregating Gender from
Sex and Sexual Orientation: The Effeminate Man in the Law and Feminist Jurisprudence, 105 YALE L.J. 1
(1995) (providing linkages between sexual orientation discrimination and gender discrimination);
Valdes, supra note 54.
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A second theoretical approach argues that the gravamen of sexual harass-
ment is the inappropriate importation of sexuality into the workplace.67  Ac-
cording to these commentators, sexualized behaviors in the workplace are expe-
rienced in gendered ways.68  Thus, they inherently meet the statutory
requirement of discrimination “because of  . . . sex.”  This approach does not de-
pend on the gender or sexual orientation of the parties and would make all such
behaviors potentially actionable, including those by gay men towards hetero-
sexual men and by heterosexual men towards gay men.69
The last theoretical approach revives and refines the anti-subordination
view of sexual harassment championed by Catharine MacKinnon.70  This ap-
proach focuses on how sexual harassment affects women (and, in some formu-
lations, men) as a group. Sexual harassment is, under this approach, a form of
sex discrimination because it contributes to the devaluative sexualization of
women,71 and/or the enforcement of norms of masculinity and femininity.72
Same-sex sexual harassment is viewed and assessed through the same lens,
which readily permits the recognition of harassment of gay men as sex-
discriminatory.73
Oncale adopts the formal equality/differential treatment approach and
seems clearly to reject the sexuality per se approach.74  Inferentially, then, it also
rejects an approach that would permit sexual harassment claims only under a
structural, anti-subordination approach and not under a formal equality ap-
proach.
The Oncale decision still permits, however, a theoretical structure that ac-
commodates both the formal equality and some form of anti-subordination ap-
proaches.75 Combining these approaches seems truer to the underlying purposes
67. See generally, Susan Estrich, Sex at Work, 43 STAN. L. REV. 813 (1991).
68. See Steven S. Locke, The Equal Opportunity Harasser as a Paradigm for Recognizing Sexual Har-
assment of Homosexuals Under Title VII, 27 RUTGERS L.J. 383 (1996); Regina L. Stone-Harris, Comment,
Same-Sex Harassment — The Next Step in the Evolution of Sexual Harassment Law Under Title VII, 28 ST.
MARY’S L.J. 269 (1996).
69. Both Locke and Stone-Harris, id., use the sex as sexuality approach to argue for extending
protection to cases involving heterosexual male harassment of other men.
70. MACKINNON, supra note 2.
71. See, e.g., Abrams, Complex Female Subject, supra note 58, at 2516 (stating that cause of action
should exist when the plaintiff is male and the challenged activity or workplace environment re-
flects an anti-woman bias); Martha Chamallas, Feminist Constructions of Objectivity: Multiple Perspec-
tives in Sexual and Racial Harassment Litigation, 1 TEX. J. WOMEN & L. 95, 124-30 (1992).
72. Franke, supra note 9; Sandra Levitsky, Note, Footnote 55: Closing the ‘Bisexual Defense’ Loop-
hole in Title VII Sexual Harassment Cases, 80 MINN. L. REV. 1013 (1996); see also Marcosson, supra note
54, at 18-21 (suggesting that sexually offensive conduct in the workplace is inherently directed at the
female sex and thus perpetuates barriers to women’s equality).
73. See, e.g., Abrams, Complex Female Subject, supra note 58, at 2518-26; Kathryn Abrams, Gender
Discrimination And The Transformation of Workplace Norms, 42 VAND. L. REV. 1183, 1209-14 (1989)
[hereinafter Abrams, Transformation of Workplace Norms]; Franke, supra note 9, at 762-71.
74. See Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Servs., Inc., 118 S. Ct. 998, 1002 (1998).  Note that this ap-
proach may still be viable under state employment discrimination statutes.  Unlike Title VII, where
the sexual harassment cause of action exists only as an extension of sex discrimination, some of
these statutes specifically recognize sexual harassment itself as illegal. See, e.g., Cummings v.
Koehnen, 568 N.W.2d 418 (Minn. 1997); Fiol v. Doellstedt, 50 Cal. App. 4th 1318 (1996).
75. In other contexts, the Supreme Court has recognized that Title VII forbids actions that re-
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of Title VII. If courts were to adopt this two-theory model,76 both gay harasser
and heterosexual harasser same-sex situations would be covered by Title VII.
The former situation, as Oncale suggests, would be viable under the formal
equality approach—the target would not have been harassed if he had been a
woman and thus not sexually desirable to the harasser. The latter situation
would be covered when the harassment reflected and perpetuated gender
stereotypes. Such harassment would perpetuate the view that workplaces are
designed for masculine men—a view that harms both non-conforming men, the
direct targets, and, indirectly, women and is thus a form of sex discrimination.
While this latter type of same-sex harassment, by heterosexual men, is the more
theoretically interesting, I want to focus the remainder of this article primarily
on the former type, in which the harasser is, or perceived to be, gay.77  The trou-
bling results, detailed below, of applying existing doctrine to these cases may
help us further refine our theoretical understanding of all sexual harassment
law.
II. APPLYING THE ELEMENTS OF SEXUAL HARASSMENT DOCTRINE TO THE
“HOMOSEXUAL HARASSER” CASE
In any hostile environment case, the plaintiff must allege and prove five
elements: that he belongs to a protected group; that he was subject to unwel-
come sexual harassment; that the harassment was based upon sex; that the har-
assment affected a “term, condition, or privilege” of employment; and that the
employer is responsible.78  Since men and women may both bring sexual har-
assment claims, the first element is rather pointless.  It “requires a simple stipu-
lation that the employee is a man or a woman.”79  The last element is subject to
flect and reinforce sex stereotypes as a form of sex discrimination .  See Los Angeles Dep’t of Water
& Power v. Manhart, 435 U.S. 702, 707 n.13 (1978) (quoting Sprogis v. United Airlines, Inc., 444 F.2d
1194, 1198 (7th Cir. 1971)). (Title VII intended to “strike at the entire spectrum of disparate treatment
of men and women resulting from sex stereotypes.”); see also Phillips v. Martin Marietta Corp., 400
U.S. 542, 544 (1971) (finding that Title VII reached a rule that excluded mothers, but not fathers, of
pre-school children from the workplace).
76. See Abrams, Transformation of Workplace Norms, supra note 73, at 1191-92 (arguing that femi-
nist theory, as applied to workplace issues, ought to embody both equality and anti-subordination
approaches and rejecting the assumption that there must be a single comprehensive principle of
anti-discrimination law).
77. The heterosexual same-sex cases, by definition, will all be of the hostile-environment vari-
ety. The gay same-sex cases may be either brought as quid pro quo or hostile environment. For pur-
poses of this analysis, I generally focus upon the hostile environment cause of action, because such
cases seem more common and because there is no indication in the case law that the sexual orienta-
tion of the parties affects a court’s willingness to find a threat or promise, as required for the quid
pro quo claim.
78. Henson v. City of Dundee, 682 F.2d 897, 903-05 (11th Cir. 1982).  If a plaintiff can show that
the harasser was a workplace superior and that there was a threat or promise associated with the
sexual advance, the case follows a quid pro quo structure. See EEOC Guidelines on Discrimination
Because of Sex, 29 C.F.R. § 1604.11(a) (1983) (focusing on the changes in one’s working conditions).
In such cases, there is no need to meet the criteria that the harassing behavior be ‘severe or perva-
sive’ and employer liability is easier to establish.
79. Henson, 682 F.2d at 903. While it appears that there is no Title VII cause of action for dis-
crimination against transsexuals, even transsexuals can state a claim insofar as they are perceived as
and harassed as men or as women. See Holloway v. Arthur Andersen & Co., 566 F.2d 659, 664 (9th
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real contention, although the most recent Supreme Court cases80 have set out a
framework that many hope will clarify the law in this area and reduce the need
for litigation.81  Nonetheless, nothing about the employer’s legal liability is af-
fected by the gender or sexual orientation of the parties.  The elements for which
these factors may significantly affect the analysis are the requirements that the
challenged conduct be ‘because of sex,’ that it is ‘severe or pervasive’ as viewed
by the plaintiff and by a reasonable person and that it is ‘unwelcome.’  Each of
these criteria, as developed below, is likely to be inappropriately construed in
the context of an alleged gay male harasser in ways that make the plaintiff’s case
easier than in the paradigm male-to-female situation.82
A. Was the Harassment “Because of Sex”?
Sexual harassment is forbidden by Title VII when it comprises practices
that “discriminate against any individual . . . because of such individual’s . . .
sex.”83  A paradigmatic example of such forbidden sexual harassment under Ti-
tle VII would be a male supervisor grabbing the breasts and buttocks of a female
employee and telling her that he wants her to engage in sexual activities with
him.84  The harasser has targeted the plaintiff because she is a woman and be-
cause he is inspired by his (heterosexual) lust for her.85  This situation is viewed
as paradigmatic in part because the earliest cases to be brought to the courts’ at-
tention were precisely of this type.86  Indeed, part of the historic achievement of
sexual harassment as a cognizable form of sex discrimination was the reconcep-
tualization of such behavior as based on sex and not merely on the non-
actionable personal proclivities of the perpetrator or the particular sexual attrac-
tion of the target.87 The shift properly recognized that Title VII should provide a
Cir. 1977); Miles v. New York Univ., 979 F. Supp. 248, 250 (S.D.N.Y. 1997).
80. See Burlington Indus., Inc. v. Ellerth, 118 S. Ct. 2257 (1998); Faragher v. City of Boca Raton,
118 S. Ct. 2275 (1998).
81. See Dominic Bencivenga, Wise Employers Adopt Full Remedial Programs, 220 N.Y.L.J. 5, (1998);
Margo L. Ely, New Liability Standards Set for Sex Harassment Claims, CHI. DAILY L. BULL., July 13, 1998
at 6 (discussing means by which employers can reduce potential liability in accordance with guide-
lines set out in these cases).
82. This will also apply, to a lesser extent, to a lesbian harasser.
83. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1) (1994).
84. Assuming that the other necessary conditions such as unwelcomeness and employer liabil-
ity are met.
85. See Meritor Sav. Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57 (1986).  In Meritor, the first sexual harassment
case to reach the United States Supreme Court, the plaintiff described a pattern of repeated de-
mands for sexual favors, sexual touchings and comments and even rape, which ceased only when
the harasser was informed that she had a boyfriend. See id. at 59-61; see also Louise F. Fitzgerald,
Who Says? Legal and Psychological Constructions of Women’s Resistance to Sexual Harassment, 6
(1998) (unpub. paper, on file with author) (describing the same phenomenon as the “courtship
trope”).
86. See, e.g., Bundy v. Jackson, 641 F.2d 934 (D.C. Cir. 1981); Barnes v. Costle, 561 F.2d 983
(D.C. Cir. 1977); Tompkins v. Public Serv. Elec. & Gas Co., 568 F.2d 1044 (3d Cir. 1977); see generally
MACKINNON, supra note 2 (collecting and describing early cases).
87. See, e.g., Corne v. Bausch & Lomb Inc., 390 F. Supp. 161, 163 (D. Ariz. 1973), vacated and re-
manded 562 F.2d 55 (9th Cir. 1977) (“Mr. Price’s conduct appears to be nothing more than a personal
proclivity, peculiarity or mannerism. By his alleged sexual advances, Mr. Price was satisfying a per-
sonal urge”).  Thus, the behavior was found to be beyond the scope of Title VII.  See id.; see also
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remedy where “sex is for no legitimate reason a substantial factor in the dis-
crimination” even if the perpetrator might not make such unwelcome advances
to every woman who comes within range.88
I do not argue that courts require a showing of lust to permit a male-female
or other sexual harassment case to proceed.89  Rather, I suggest, as have other
commentators,90 that the use of heterosexual lust driven harassment as the para-
digmatic case has distorted the focus of Title VII law, making some situations
harder to see as actionable than they should be and others, such as homosexual
male-to-male behavior, as easier than they should be.
In seeing such cases as paradigmatic, courts made two assumptions.  First,
the courts assumed that the men who engaged in harassing behavior towards
women were heterosexual.91  Second, they assumed that heterosexual men, in
engaging in such behavior towards women, were driven by lust.92  Conse-
quently, the lust paradigm has had highly deleterious effects on the larger body
of male-on-female sexual harassment cases.93  A full understanding of the lust
Tomkins, 422 F. Supp. at 556 (Title VII does not cover “what amounts to physical attack motivated
by sexual desire on the part of a supervisor and which happened to occur in a corporate corridor
rather than a back alley”); Ellen Paul, Sexual Harassment as Sex Discrimination: A Defective Paradigm, 8
YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 333, 349-50 (1990) (arguing that although a practice is not discriminatory un-
less it is directed towards all members of the group, but in lust-driven sexual harassment the perpe-
trator directs his behavior toward a particular person who happens to be female).
88. Bundy, 641 F.2d at 942.  See generally MACKINNON, supra note 2 (explaining why such be-
havior is sex discrimination). This view has become standard in male-female cases. See, e.g., King v.
Board of Regents, 898 F.2d 533, 539 (7th Cir. 1990) (finding a sex discrimination and thus a Title VII,
cause of action where “[h]is actions were based on her gender and motivated by his libido”).
89. See, e.g., Doe v. City of Belleville, 119 F.3d. 563, 575 (7th Cir. 1997) (finding cause of action
for behaviors intended to demean the plaintiffs in ways linked to their sex); Chiapuzio v. BLT Oper-
ating Corp., 826 F. Supp. 1334 (D. Wyo. 1993) (same).
90. See Schultz, supra note 2, at 1686-87 (stating that “much of the gender-based hostility and
abuse that women (or men) endure is neither driven by the desire for sexual relations nor even sex-
ual in content.”); Fitzgerald, supra note 85, at 12 (arguing that “sexual harassment has nothing to do
with attraction”).
91. See, e.g., Vandeventer v. Wabash Nat’l Corp., 887 F. Supp. 1178 (N.D. Ind. 1995). The court
discusses the significance of sexual orientation in assessing a same sex claim, but notes that “[w]hen
a man touches a woman in a sexual manner, or asks her to have sexual relations with him it can be
presumed that he is doing so because she is a woman. Her gender is probably not incidental.” Id. at
1181. The court simply assumes the heterosexuality of that perpetrator.
The heterosexual presumption is “reasonable and efficient” in the male-on-female sexual
harassment case. See Franke, supra note 9, at 693.  However, insofar as the assumption reflects an
unconscious view of the world, it obscures the deliberate policy judgment that Professor Franke
makes, and that might allow the presumption to be rebutted in appropriate cases.
92. Sexual harassment in the workplace has been viewed, in essence, as a form of sexually
predatory behavior that happens to occur in the workplace, rather than a form of sex discrimination
that happens to involve the use of sexually aggressive words and actions. See generally Estrich, supra
note 67 (constructing sexual harassment as an analogue to rape).
93. Schultz, supra note 2.  These deleterious effects include an obscuring of the extent to which
plaintiffs are subjected to non-sexualized gender harassment, the ways in which gender harassment
and sexual harassment reinforce each other, and the ways in which sexualized harassment may re-
flect aggression and animus towards women as well as sexual desire for them. See, e.g., EEOC v.
Farmer Bros. Co., 31 F.3d 891, 897-98 (9th Cir. 1994) (distinguishing cases of unwanted sexual atten-
tion from those in which the employer is “using sexual harassment primarily to subordinate
women”, but recognizing that “in many cases the sexual harasser will have a mixed motive for en-
gaging in this type of conduct”); see also Hall v. Gus Constr. Co., 842 F.2d 1010 (8th Cir. 1988)
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paradigm’s harms to sexual harassment law are especially apparent when fo-
cusing on same-sex cases.  It is perhaps not surprising, then, that it was a court
faced with a same-sex case that most clearly recognized the error of the para-
digm as “betray[ing] a fundamental misconception that sexual harassment in-
evitably is a matter of sexual desire run amok.”94
The harms of the lust paradigm can be seen in the analysis of the pre-Oncale
cases that denied a cause of action for heterosexual same-sex harassment, since
this was perceived as definitionally not rooted in sexual desire.95  Male-to-female
sexualized offensive speech and touching of genitalia is sexual harassment be-
cause it is a form of sexual advance.  Yet, the same behavior among heterosexual
men is not meant as a sexual advance, but “mere horseplay.”96  If “because of . . .
sex” becomes equated with “because of . . . the actor’s sexual desires,” such
horseplay is outside Title VII.  Under the lust paradigm, the targets of hetero-
sexual same-sex harassment—a group that is likely to frequently include men
who are, or are perceived to be, gay—have no federal remedy.  The heterosexual
lust paradigm also, however, harms gay men as potential defendants because it
both dichotomizes and essentializes sexual orientation.97  Gay men are assumed
to comprise a definable, discrete category. When people within the category en-
gage in sexualized behavior towards other men, it is assumed to reflect their
lust-driven sexual desire for the target.98  All other men are presumed heterosex-
(involving the use of both sexualized and non-sexualized techniques of harassment against women
in non-traditional work); Robinson v. Jacksonville Shipyards, Inc., 760 F. Supp. 1486 (M.D. Fla. 1991)
(same); Steiner v. Showboat Operating Co., 25 F.3d 1459 (9th Cir. 1994) cert. denied 115 S. Ct. 733
(1995) (same); Bell v. Crackin Good Bakers Inc., 777 F.2d 1497 (11th Cir. 1985) (same).
94. Doe v. City of Belleville, 119 F.3d 563, 586 (7th Cir. 1997), vacated and remanded by Oncale v.
Sundowner Offshore Servs. Inc., 118 S. Ct. 1183 (1998).
95. See, e.g., McWilliams v. Fairfax County Bd. of Supervisors, 72 F.3d 1191 (4th Cir. 1996);
Goluszek v. Smith, 697 F. Supp. 1452 (N.D. Ill. 1988); Dillon v. Frank, No.90-2290, 1992 WL 5436, at
*1 (6th Cir. 1992) (stating that comments such as “Dillon sucks dicks, or gives head” were not sex-
based harassment when directed against plaintiff perceived as gay by heterosexual male cowork-
ers).  Courts rejecting or severely circumscribing the cause of action for heterosexual same sex har-
assment also seem driven by a fear of a slippery slope into a federal civility code. See infra text ac-
companying note 40.
96. See Martin v. Norfolk S. Ry. Co., 926 F. Supp. 1044, 1049 (N.D. Ala. 1996) (finding no cause
of action for same-sex heterosexual hostile environment since “the presumption of sexual gratifica-
tion and thus, sex discrimination ceases to exist”).
97. There is, of course, one exception to this dichotomization: the mythical bisexual harasser.
Regardless of the fact that there are no reported cases involving an actual bisexual harasser, the
theoretical possibility of a bisexual harasser has regularly been a subject of case law and commen-
tary. See, e.g., Barnes v. Costle, 561 F.2d 983, 990 n.55 (D.C. Cir. 1977); Dixon v. State Farm Fire &
Cas. Ins. Co., Civ. A. No. 4:94CV165, 1995 WL 810016 (E.D. Va. Aug. 23, 1995); Ryczek v. Guest
Servs., Inc., 877 F. Supp. 754, 762 (D.D.C. 1995) (referring to such a bisexual harasser as a
“particularly unspeakable cad”); Calleros, supra note 61.  In any event, even under a lust paradigm,
the real issue is not orientation in general, but particular behavior. Only if the defendant at the
workplace sexually harassed both men and women could one say that the harassment was not be-
cause of sex. Cf. Dixon v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Ins. Co., 926 F. Supp. 548, 551 (E.D. Va. 1996)
(suggesting, in a same-sex sexual harassment case that the proper issue is characterization of be-
havior and that sexual orientation vel non should not be an element of plaintiff’s case).
98. See Fredette v. BVP Management Assocs., 112 F.3d 1503, 1505 (11th Cir. 1997) (“The rea-
sonably inferred motives of the homosexual harasser are identical to those of the heterosexual har-
asser—i.e., the harasser makes advances towards the victim because the victim is a member of the
gender the harasser prefers.”).  See also Christopher W. Deering, Comment, Same-Gender Sexual Har-
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ual, and their behavior towards other men is therefore presumed never to be
driven by sexual desire.99  Thus, courts that see heterosexual same-sex harass-
ment as nothing but non-actionable horseplay100 may be all too ready to find sex
discrimination in any homosexual same-sex harassment.101  As an example of the
courts’ willingness, consider the following quote from Yeary v. Goodwill Indus-
tries-Knoxville, Inc.:102
 [T]his case is as traditional as they come, albeit with a twist. It is
about an employee making sexual propositions to and physi-
cally assaulting a coworker because, it appears, he finds that
coworker sexually attractive . . . we find no substantive differ-
ence between [male-to-female or female-to-male situations] and
that present here.103
In contrast to the male-to-female case, however, the sexual attraction of the
perpetrator for a same-sex target cannot be assumed.  Rather, it is an issue to be
proved.104  Because of the assumption that sexual orientation is fixed and di-
chotomous, however, the issue becomes not the motivation of the perpetrator for
the particular behavior complained of, but his sexual orientation as such.  Men
who sexually harass women are assumed to be heterosexual and acting out of
lust; men who sexually harass men are assumed either (a) to be heterosexuals
engaging in non-sexual horseplay105 or (b) homosexuals indulging their sexual
assment: A Need to Reexamine the Legal Underpinnings of Title VII’s Ban on Discrimination “Because Of”
Sex, 27 CUMB. L. REV. 231 (1996-1997) (critiquing courts for shifting focus from the events in the
workplace to the attempt to discover the plaintiff’s ‘true’ sexual orientation).
99. See McWilliams, 72 F.3d 1191.  This approach ignores the substantial evidence that people
who identify themselves as heterosexual do engage in same-sex sexual behavior. See, e.g., Develop-
ments in the Law —Sexual Orientation and the Law, 102 HARV. L. REV. 1508, 1511 n.1 (1989); EDWARD
O. LAUMANN, THE SOCIETAL ORGANIZATION OF SEXUALITY 283, 287-301 (1994) (stating that the con-
cept of sexual orientation is a complex one, comprising elements of sexual history, sexual desire,
and self-understanding, which are related in subtle ways); John P. DeCecco, Definition and Meaning
of Sexual Orientation, in PHILOSOPHY AND HOMOSEXUALITY 51, 64 (Noretta Koertge, ed. 1985).
100. See, e.g., Blueford v. K.W. Prunty, 108 F.3d 251, 254 (9th Cir. 1997) (rejecting a claimed
“right under federal law to be free of puerile and vulgar same-sex trash talk” in heterosexual same-
sex case).
101. See, e.g., McCoy v. Macon Water Auth., 966 F. Supp. 1209, 1217 (M.D. Ga. 1997) (citing Mar-
tin v. Norfolk S. Ry. Co., 926 F. Supp. 1044, 1049 (N.D. Ala. 1996)) (explicitly stating that a Title VII
cause of action is available for homosexual, but not for heterosexual, same sex sexual harassment).
As with male-female cases, the quid pro quo (and thus inherently homosexual, attraction-based)
cases were the most readily recognized as actionable.  See, e.g., Wright v. Methodist Youth Servs.,
511 F. Supp. 307 (N.D. Ill. 1981); Joyner v. AAA Cooper Transp., 597 F. Supp. 537 (M.D. Ala. 1983).
102. 107 F.3d 443 (6th Cir. 1997).
103. Id. at 447-48; see also Fredette v. BVP Management Assocs., 112 F.3d 1503 (11th Cir. 1997);
Wright, 511 F. Supp. at 310; Dixon v. State Farm Fire Cas. Ins. Co., Civ. A. No. 4.94CV165, 1995 WL
810016, at *6 (E.D. Va. Aug. 23, 1995); Boyd v. Vonnahmen, No. 93-CV-4358-JPG, 1995 WL 420040
(S.D. Ill. Mar. 29, 1995).
104. See Amy Shahan, Comment, Determining Whether Title VII Provides a Cause of Action for
Same-Sex Sexual Harassment, 48 BAYLOR L. REV. 507, 517 (1996) (noting the hetero-normativity of this
approach); cf. Blozis v. Mike Raisor Ford Inc., 896 F. Supp. 805, 807 (N.D. Ind. 1995) (stating that in
the male-female context, courts can assume sexualized behavior is ‘because of sex;’ whereas in the
male-male context, the  plaintiff must prove that the harassment is because of sex either by showing
that the perpetrator is homosexual [the lust paradigm] or that he is acting out of an anti-male ani-
mus).
105. See, e.g., Goluszek v. Smith, 697 F. Supp. 1452 (N.D. Ill. 1988); Ashworth v. Roundup Co.,
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desires for the plaintiff.106  The key issue is deciding in which category the par-
ticular defendant fits.107
Some courts have recognized that making the defendant’s sexual orienta-
tion an issue will lead to “appalling” discovery processes.108  All the stereotypes
that people use to guess at a person’s homosexual orientation may become sub-
ject to discovery and to testimony and argument at trial.109  Yet, it is difficult to
see how disputes over sexual orientation can be avoided unless and until the
courts move away from either the lust paradigm or the assumption that par-
ticular workplace behavior is merely an instance of an external and immutable
sexual orientation.
Defendants in these cases are subject not only to a privacy-shattering in-
vestigation of their sexual orientation, but also a stereotype-based misreading of
their behavior.  Courts often assume that sexual orientation is always manifested
and thus is equivalent to an explanation for particular behavior.110  Thus, am-
biguous behavior, which might be seen as mere puerility or vulgarity if engaged
in by a heterosexual perpetrator,111 is instead seen as “because of sex” once the
perpetrator is defined as gay.112  The court in Griswold v. Fresenius USA, Inc.113 for
example, recognized the ambiguity of such actions by the perpetrator as putting
897 F. Supp. 489 (W.D. Wash. 1995).
106. See Tietgen v. Brown’s Westminster Motors, Inc., 921 F. Supp. 1495, 1501-02 (E.D. Va. 1996)
(concluding that a plaintiff in a same sex case must “must plead and prove that the alleged harasser
was sexually attracted to his victim or homosexual” since otherwise the allegedly harassing conduct
could as easily be construed as “mere locker room antics, joking, or horseplay.); see also Franke, su-
pra note 9, at 737.
107. See Hopkins v. Baltimore Gas & Elec. Co. 77 F.3d 745, 752 (4th Cir. 1996) cert. denied 117 S.
Ct. 70 (1996) (“The principal way in which this burden [of showing that same-sex harassment is be-
cause of sex] may be met is with proof that the harasser acted out of sexual attraction to the em-
ployee”). Hopkins then indicates that external evidence is necessary; it is insufficient that the chal-
lenged behavior itself could be construed as a manifestation of same-sex sexual attraction.
108. See Doe v. City of Belleville, 119 F.3d 563, 589 (7th Cir. 1997); Ryczek v Guest Servs., 877 F.
Supp. 754, 762  (D.D.C. 1995); see also Deering, supra note 99, at 287.
Some courts pointed to this issue in justifying the denial of relief in any same-sex situation.
See, e.g., Torres v. National Precision Blanking, 943 F. Supp. 952, 960 (N.D. Ill. 1996) (“In order to
allow same-gender sexual harassment actionability, federal courts would be required to delve into
the gyttja [sic] of subjective psychological analysis in litigation”).  That resolution, of course, is
barred by Oncale.
109. If a man is married, he is presumably heterosexual and thus not engaged in lust-based sex-
ual harassment of other men.  Conversely, if he is single, especially if he has a male roommate, one
might infer that he was gay. Limp wrists, swishy walks, being seen at known homosexual hangouts
all provide evidence that the man is gay.  See Griswold v. Fresenius USA, Inc. 978 F. Supp. 718, 723
(N.D. Ohio 1997).
110. See, e.g., McWilliams v. Fairfax County Bd. of Supervisors, 72 F.3d 1191 (4th Cir. 1996); Fre-
dette v. BVP Management Assocs., 112 F.3d 1503 (11th Cir. 1997).
111. See Papish, supra note 9, at 203-04; Nancy Levit, Feminism for Men: Legal Ideology and the
Construction of Maleness, 43 UCLA L. REV. 1037, 1069 (1996).
112. See, e.g., Waag v. Thomas Pontiac, Buick, GMC, Inc., 930 F. Supp. 393, 403-06 (D. Minn.
1996) (rejecting the defendant’s motion for summary judgment and finding sufficient evidence to
allow the inference that the perpetrator was making sexual advances and thus that the behavior was
‘because of sex”).  For example, in Waag, the plaintiff did not perceive his male supervisor’s frequent
touching of his abdomen accompanied by comments that he “kept in shape” as sexual until the su-
pervisor told him a homosexual sexually explicit joke.   See id. at 396.
113. 978 F. Supp. 718, 728 (N.D. Ohio 1997).
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his arms around the plaintiffs’ shoulders, rubbing their backs and patting their
buttocks, allegedly in a sexually suggestive manner.  It permitted the plaintiff to
proceed with his case, however, because other evidence of the perpetrator’s
stereotypically homosexual behaviors could lead a fact-finder to conclude that
he was acting out of  sexual desire and thus “because of . . . sex.”114
Oncale acknowledges that the lust paradigm is not the only way in which
harassment can be based on sex.115  Although it begins its list of the ways in
which same-sex harassment can be shown to be because of sex with the “easy”
inference from the homosexual orientation of the harasser, it goes on to note
other possible modes, including a showing that the plaintiff is “harassed in such
sex-specific and derogatory terms . . . as to make it clear that the harasser is mo-
tivated by general hostility” to persons of the plaintiff’s [and the harasser’s]
sex.116  This approach does not protect gay alleged harassers from the harms de-
tailed above. 117  It does, however, facilitate recognition of the alternative mode of
same-sex harassment, which is rooted in gender animus.  Heterosexual male-to-
male sexual harassment, like male-to-female sexual harassment, is often rooted
in a particular vision of gender and work.  The workplace is reserved for real
men; this ideology is enforced by harassment of women and certain men be-
cause of their performance, or lack of it, as men.118  As others have noted, the
male plaintiffs who might have a cause of action for sex-discriminatory sexual
harassment under an animus theory are especially likely to be men who are, or
114. Id. at 731.  But see Fox v. Sierra Dev. Co., 876 F. Supp. 1169, 1174-75 (D. Nev. 1995) (resisting
the temptation to equate the homosexuality of the perpetrator with a finding that his harassment of
the same-sex plaintiff was “because of sex”).  In Fox, the male plaintiffs charged that they were the
victims of hostile environment sexual harassment by being subjected to sexually explicit writings,
drawings and discussions of “homosexual acts . . . and other topics in a depraved manner.” Id. at
1172.  The plaintiffs claimed protection for their heterosexual sensibilities, not for their masculinity,
within the alleged hostile work environment.  The Fox court focused on the heart of the claim,
namely the plaintiff’s reaction, rather than on the perpetrator’s (irrelevant) sexual orientation, and
dismissed the action.  Id. at 1174.  Logically, the plaintiff’s sexual orientation should not matter,
since it need affect neither the perpetrator’s choice to target him as sexually appealing nor the plain-
tiff’s decision not to respond favorably to such advances. See, e.g., Johnson v. Community Nursing
Servs., 932 F. Supp. 269, 273-74 (D. Utah 1996) (noting that sex of harasser does not matter).  Yet in
the same sex context, some courts have suggested that the target’s sexual orientation is relevant. See,
e.g., Hopkins v. Baltimore Gas & Elec. Co. 77 F.3d 745 (4th Cir. 1996), cert. denied 117 S. Ct. 70 (1996);
Wrightson v. Pizza Hut of Am., Inc., 99 F.3d 138 (4th Cir. 1996).  But see Doe v. City of Belleville, 119
F.3d 563 (7th Cir. 1997).
115. See Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Servs., Inc., 118 S. Ct. 998, 1002 (1998).
116. Id.
117. See id.  As Doe puts it, showing that the perpetrator is homosexual becomes sufficient,
though not necessary, to demonstrate that the same sex harassment was because of sex. See Doe, 119
F.3d at 575.
118. See Franke, supra note 9; Koppelman, supra note 64; Schultz, supra note 2. In the same sex
context, mixed motives, including the target’s gender, seem sometimes to be deemed insufficient for
Title VII liability.  Cf. Caldwell v. KFC Corp., 958 F. Supp. 962, 969 (D.N.J. 1997) (stating that Title
VII’s purpose is to protect discrete and vulnerable groups).
Other courts however recognize that in at least some same-sex situations “an employee
may suffer harassment based on sex that is motivated by pure misanthropy or misogyny. Title VII
prohibits discrimination in all its forms, and . . . is not limited to discrimination in the form of un-
wanted sexual advances committed by an individual who is actually serious.”  Griswold v. Fresen-
ius USA, Inc., 978 F. Supp. 718, 728 (N.D. Ohio 1997).
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are perceived as, gay.119  A plaintiff such as Oncale might prevail if he can show
that the harassers “were motivated by general hostility to the presence of” per-
sons of the plaintiff’s sex.120  Oncale leaves the door slightly open to make this ar-
gument.  But it opens the door wide for extending the lust-based paradigm to
protect heterosexual plaintiffs where there is “credible evidence that the harasser
was homosexual.”121  Overall, based on Oncale’s approach to the “because of sex”
issue, it is not clear if gays in the workplace are better or worse off than if the
Supreme Court had limited Title VII to opposite-sex harassment.
B. Was the Harassment Severe or Pervasive?
Not all discriminatory speech or conduct in the workplace violates Title VII.
As indicated in the EEOC guidelines, such behavior is forbidden when it “has
the purpose or effect of unreasonably interfering with an individual’s work per-
formance or creating an  intimidating, hostile, or offensive working environ-
ment.”122  Under the standard formulations of the doctrine, the plaintiff must
show that the harassment was objectively severe and pervasive.123 It is necessary,
but not sufficient, to show that the plaintiff found the behavior hostile or offen-
sive because “Title VII does not serve ‘as a vehicle for vindicating the petty
slights suffered by the hypersensitive.’”124  Furthermore, “conduct that is not se-
vere or pervasive enough to create an objectively hostile or abusive work envi-
ronment—an environment that a reasonable person would find hostile or abu-
sive—is beyond Title VII’s purview.”125
119. See Franke, supra note 9, at 696-97; Grose, supra note 63.  In at least one case, however, ho-
mosexual same sex harassment is misconstrued as lust driven.  The perpetrators were a group of
gay men who harassed the plaintiff and other heterosexual men.  The Fourth Circuit allowed the
case to proceed because the perpetrators were gay, a distinction that can be determinative only
through a lust-based paradigm.  Consider the behavior there however.  The perpetrators
“graphically describe[d their] homosexual lifestyle”; “subject[ed the plaintiff] to vulgar homosexual
sexual remarks”; and pulled down his pants, making sexually explicit remarks while touching him.
Wrightson v. Pizza Hut of Am. Inc., 99 F.3d 138, 139-40 (4th Cir. 1996).  This behavior does not seem
to reflect sexual desire for the plaintiff and his fellow targets or an attempt to induce the plaintiff to
engage in homosexual behaviors with them. Rather, it suggests a misuse of power, in a workplace
with a strong representation of gay men, to embarrass and humiliate the plaintiff, a straight man
who, they rightly perceived, was vulnerable to such sexualized teasing and trash-talk. The case is, in
effect, a mirror image of Goluszek, rather than a heterosexual lust-based sexual harassment case be-
cause the plaintiff was targeted because he was male and because he was straight.  Katharine Franke
describes the behavior in Wrightson as “group harassment” of straight men. See Franke, supra note 9,
at 743.  See also McCoy v. Johnson Controls World Servs., Inc., 878 F. Supp. 229, 231 (S.D. Ga. 1995)
(construing a case as homosexual sexual harassment when a black female perpetrator rubbed her
breasts against a white female plaintiff’s chest and forced her tongue into plaintiff’s mouth even
though plaintiff’s own evidence indicates perpetrator had explained her behavior in terms of racial
animus: “we have always been able to make a white bitch like you quit, you’re one stubborn stupid
bitch”).
120. Oncale, 118 S. Ct. at 1002.
121. Id.
122. 29 C.F.R. § 1604.11(a)(3) (1998).
123. See EEOC: Policy Guidance on Sexual Harassment, 405 Fair Empl. Prac. Man. (BNA) 6681
(Mar. 19, 1990) [hereinafter EEOC Guidance].
124. See id. at 3231 (quoting Zabkowicz v. West Bend Co., 589 F. Supp. 780, 784 (E.D. Wis.
1984)).
125. Harris v.  Forklift Sys., Inc., 510 U.S. 17, 21 (1993) (emphasis added).
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The assessment is necessarily quite fact-specific. The Supreme Court in Har-
ris126 acknowledged that determining if a particular environment would reasona-
bly be perceived as hostile or abusive requires “looking at all the circumstances.
These may include the frequency of the discriminatory conduct; its severity;
whether it is physically threatening or humiliating, or a mere offensive utter-
ance, and whether it unreasonably interferes with an employee’s work perform-
ance.”127  The ultimate determination requires an assessment of “the record as a
whole and . . . the totality of the circumstances;” it must be made “on a case by
case basis.”128  This approach embodies all the problems inherent in any use of a
standard rather than a rule.129  Even if a set of fact-finders could agree on what
had happened in each case, and on the relative severity, so that the cases could
be unanimously rank-ordered, there is neither a determinate legal formulation
nor a societal consensus as to where the line should be drawn between those
situations that are sufficiently severe and pervasive and those that are legally
permissible.
If the concept of “severe and pervasive” cannot be defined in a sufficiently
precise way to resolve cases, an alternative means of guiding fact-finders might
be through providing a consistent perspective from which the varied situations
can be assessed. Drawing on the analogous problem of determining
“negligence” in tort cases, one might require that the fact-finder apply the per-
spective of the “reasonable person.”130 Both Harris and Oncale adopt, in passing,
such a reasonable person standard.131
But who is this reasonable person?  And, since he is neither a god nor a
starfish, the reasonable person cannot be sexless. Is he really the classic
“reasonable man” in gender-neutral clothing?132
126. Id.
127. Id. at 23; see also Ross v. Double Diamond, Inc., 672 F. Supp. 261, 270-71 (N.D. Tex. 1987)
(detailing some of the relevant factors).
128. 29 C.F.R. § 1604.11(b) (1998).
129. See Harris, 510 U.S. at 24, 25 (Scalia J. concurring) (noting plaintively that the formulation
“lets virtually unguided juries decide whether sex-related conduct engaged in (or permitted by) an
employer is egregious enough to warrant an award of damages,” but concluding that no more de-
terminate formulation is consistent with the “inherently vague statutory language”).
130. Cf. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 291 (1965) (adopting “reasonable person” standard
to determine if an act is negligent).
131. See Harris, 510 U.S. at 21; Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Servs., Inc., 118 S. Ct. 998, 1003
(1998) (stating that common sense and sensitivity to social context will permit fact-finders to distin-
guish between “simple teasing or roughhousing among members of the same sex, and conduct
which a reasonable person in the plaintiff’s position would find severely hostile or abusive” (emphasis
added)).
132. See Laurie A. Taylor, Comment, Provoked Reasons in Men and Women: Heat of Passion Man-
slaughter and Imperfect Self-Defense, 33 UCLA L. REV. 1679, 1691-92 (1986) (discussing the assertion
that the “reasonable man” despite the linguistic shift to “reasonable person” remains a gendered
being, distinct from the “reasonable woman”); see also A.P. HERBERT, MISLEADING CASES IN THE
COMMON LAW 20 (1930) (commenting on the traditional absence of a “reasonable woman” concept
in the common law and stating that “the view that there exists a class of beings, illogical, impulsive,
careless, irresponsible, extravagant, prejudiced, and vain, free for the most part from those worthy
and repellent excellences which distinguish the Reasonable Man, and devoted to the irrational arts
of pleasure and attraction, is one which should be as welcome . . . in our Courts as it is in our
drawing-rooms.  I find therefore that at Common Law a reasonable woman does not exist.”)
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Perhaps the most famous, or infamous, case to analyze the meaning and
significance of the reasonable person standard in sexual harassment law is
Rabidue v. Osceola Refining Co.133  Vivienne Rabidue was the sole woman manager
in a company where male employees regularly displayed pictures of nude or
scantily clad women.134 Another manager, Douglas Henry, with whom she had
to interact frequently, “was an extremely vulgar and crude individual who cus-
tomarily made obscene comments about women generally, and, on occasion, di-
rected such obscenities to the plaintiff.”135  The Sixth Circuit concluded that a
reasonable person would not have found this behavior so severe or pervasive as
to violate Title VII’s proscriptions.136  They focused on the need to be sensitive to
context.137  The “context” in which these events occurred, they noted, was a
workplace that had always been one of rough-hewn language.138  Furthermore,
such language, along with “sexual jokes, sexual conversations and girlie maga-
zines” are part of the lexicon of many American workplaces and pictures similar
to those displayed there are available on many newsstand racks.139  Viewing the
behaviors contextually, the majority concluded that “although annoying, [they]
were not so startling as to have affected seriously the psyches of the plaintiff or
other female employees.”140
Other judges, some perhaps influenced by the widespread criticism of
Rabidue,141 rejected such a purely objective reasonable person standard.  Some
expressed concern that the reasonable person standard, especially as applied
therein, seems to embody the expectations and behaviors of the ordinary man142
as a standard of reasonableness to which women are expected to adjust.143  Some
courts responded directly to the perceived implicit maleness of the reasonable
person standard by calling instead for a “reasonable woman” standard, in order
to respond appropriately to the different perspectives of men and women.144
133. 805 F.2d 611 (6th Cir. 1986).
134. See id. at 615.
135. See id.  The dissent was more graphic: noting that Mr. Henry routinely referred to women
as “cunt,” “whores,” “pussy,” and “tits,” and described Ms. Rabidue as a “bitch” who needed “a
good lay”).  See id. at 624 (Keith, J., dissenting).
136. See id. at 622.
137. See id. at 620.
138. See id.
139. Id. at 620 (quoting Rabidue v. Osceola Refining Co., 584 F. Supp. 419, 430 (E.D. Mich.
1984)).
140. Id. at 622.
141. See, e.g., Chamallas, supra note 71; Amy Horton, Comment, Of Supervision, Centerfolds, and
Censorship: Sexual Harassment, the First Amendment, and the Contours of Title VII, 46 U. MIAMI L. REV.
403 (1991); Susan M. Matthews, Title VII And Sexual Harassment: Beyond Damages Control, 3 YALE J.L.
& FEMINISM 299 (1991).
142. More precisely, the judges’ assumptions about ordinary working class men. See Nancy S.
Ehrenreich, Pluralist Myths and Powerless Men: The Ideology of Reasonableness in Sexual Harassment
Law, 99 YALE L.J. 1177, 1202 (1990).
143. See Rabidue, 805 F.2d at 626 (Keith, J., dissenting) (noting that the majority’s reasonable per-
son standard “fails to account for the wide divergence between most women’s views of appropriate
sexual conduct and those of men”).  See also Ehrenreich, supra note 142, at 1209 (discussing the class
bias built into the Rabidue majority opinion).
144. See Ellison v. Brady, 924 F.2d 872, 878-79 (9th Cir. 1991). See also Robinson v. Jacksonville
Shipyards, Inc., 760 F. Supp. 1486, 1524 (M.D. Fla. 1991) (using an objective standard which “asks
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These courts adopt the language of “reasonable woman,” in the context of a
male-on-female harassment claim, so we cannot be certain, for example, what
standard would be used in the context of other gender combinations.145  Other
courts have used a variety of linguistic formulations which do not make clear the
rationale for the formula chosen and thus what the proper formula should be
where the harasser is female or the victim male.146
Academic commentators have also been critical of the unmodified reason-
able persons standard147 and have put forth a range of alternatives.148  Rabidue
demonstrates the faults of a test that simply adopts the perspective of the aver-
age person. The same-sex cases, as developed below,149 indicate that a gender-
specified but analogous test is no better, for it would judge such a claim from the
perspective of the average man.  What is needed is a test of “normative reason-
ableness.”150  I suggest that the most recent approach to this problem by Profes-
whether a reasonable person of Robinson’s sex, that is, a reasonable woman, would perceive that an
abusive working environment has been created”). The factual situation in Robinson was quite similar
to that in Rabidue: a token woman in a dominantly male workplace confronted with pervasive por-
nography and obscenity-laced comments.
145. See Ellison, 924 F.2d at 879. In addition to its “reasonable woman” language, Ellison at one
point describes its standard as the response of “a reasonable victim of the same sex as the plaintiff.”
146. See Jane L. Dolkart, Hostile Environment Harassment: Equality, Objectivity, and the Shaping of
Legal Standards, 43 EMORY L.J. 151, 163 (1994) (footnotes omitted) (noting the range of formulae
adopted by courts: “the reasonable person, the reasonable woman, the reasonable person of the
same sex as the plaintiff, the reasonable victim, and the blended perspective of both the reasonable
man and the reasonable woman”).  See also Andrews v. City of Philadelphia,  895 F.2d 1469, 1482
(3d Cir. 1990) (stating that the test is whether the behavior would “detrimentally affect a reasonable
person of the same sex”); Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Servs., Inc., 118 S. Ct. 998, 1003 (1998)
(quoting Harris v. Forklift Sys. Inc., 510 U.S. 17, 21 (1993) and referring to the “reasonable person in
the plaintiff’s position, considering ‘all the circumstances’”).
147. See Ehrenreich, supra note 142, at 1213 (commentators have argued that the reasonable per-
son approach “explicitly sets up middle-class, male values as the source of the ‘objective’ stan-
dard”).
148. Professor Burns discusses the standard proposed by the EEOC in 1993 that considered the
perspective of a “reasonable person in the same or similar circumstances.”  This standard includes
“considerations of the perspective of persons of the alleged victim’s race, color, religion, gender, na-
tional origin, age, or disability.” Sarah E. Burns, Evidence of a Sexually Hostile Workplace: What Is It
and How Should it Be Assessed After Harris v. Forklift Systems Inc.?, 21 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE
357, 390 (1994-95).  See Chamallas, supra note 71, at 129 (suggesting the perspective of “a reasonable
target of harassment”); Dolkart, supra note 146, at 154 (suggesting a test involving the “hypothetical
reasonable person in the situation of the victim, with the experiences and perceptions of the vic-
tim”).
While existing case law allows for the development of these or other refinements of the tests
in  Harris or Oncale, it is not possible, without overturning those cases, to reject any reasonableness
limit to the plaintiff’s subjective perception that the harassment was severe or pervasive, as some
commentators have proposed. See e.g., B. Glenn George, The Back Door: Legitimizing Sexual Harass-
ment Claims, 73 B.U. L. REV. 1, 27-28 (1993) (advocating that an objective test of the severity or per-
vasiveness need only be shown only in a limited range of sexual harassment claims).  See also
Abrams, Transformation of Workplace Norms, supra note 73, at 1209 (suggesting that the subjective re-
sponse of the plaintiff should be sufficient to establish her prima facie case, although the defendant
could rebut it with objective evidence showing that most people would view the claims as wholly
trivial).
149. See infra text accompanying notes 158-69.
150. That is, the question is not how the typical person would react to the described behaviors,
but how we as a society, committed to the goals of Title VII, would expect people in the plaintiff’s
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sor Abrams gives us such a test.151
Under what I will call the “Abrams test,” harassing behavior should be
judged from the perspective of a person who has adequate knowledge about
sexual harassment, including “the barriers that women have faced and continue
to face in the workplace [and] the effects sexual harassment has on the work
lives of its targets.”152  This normatively reasonable person will be informed
about the techniques and effects of sexual harassment and committed to eradi-
cating patterns of gender subordination.  He or she will judge the challenged be-
havior by whether it was likely to interfere with the target’s capacity to exhibit,
and to be judged on, his or her competence as a worker.153
While no court has yet explicitly adopted the Abrams test, one can see as-
pects of its approach in the decision in Bennett v. Corroon & Black Corp.154  In Ben-
nett, the Fifth Circuit stated that the posting in the men’s room of obscene car-
toons depicting the plaintiff was sufficiently offensive to meet the objective
prong of the test: “Any reasonable person would have to regard these cartoons
as highly offensive to a woman who seeks to deal with her fellow employees and
clients with professional dignity.”155  Because the test is normative rather than
descriptive, it avoids the gender problem.  We do not ask how the typical man or
the typical woman acts, or how each of them would react to the challenged be-
haviors.  Instead, the Abrams test requires a determination of what, given the
adoption of Title VII, a person is entitled to expect.  Fact-finders, male or female,
are not asked simply to decide how they would feel, but to educate themselves
about sexual harassment and then decide how such an educated person would
respond.156
While the ‘Abrams test’ cannot in itself give us the dividing line between
actionable harassment and non-actionable forms of sexualized speech or con-
duct, it asks the proper question.  It recognizes the ways in which much sexual-
ized speech or conduct can interfere with the target’s capacity to work or to be
judged by her work.  It simultaneously recognizes that there is a level of sexual
banter or personal conversation that normally occurs in workplaces and does not
have these effects.157
position to have to tolerate such behaviors. See generally Cynthia Kwei Yung Lee, Race and Self-
Defense: Toward a Normative Conception of Reasonableness, 81 MINN. L. REV. 367 (1996) (discussing the
normative conception of reasonableness).
151. Kathryn Abrams, The New Jurisprudence of Sexual Harassment, 83 CORNELL L. REV. 1169
(1998).
152. Id. at 1178.
153. Cf. Schultz, supra note 2 (constructing a competence-centered account of the harms of sex-
ual harassment).
154. Bennett v. Corroon & Black Corp., 845 F.2d 104 (5th Cir. 1988).
155. Id. at 106.
156. I am reminded of a debate that occurred when I was a law clerk. A case had arisen in which
the U.S. Customs Service had refused entry to certain material on their judgment that the materials
were obscene according to contemporary community standards. One participant argued
(persuasively to me, although not ultimately to the bench) that the proper question was not whether
the typical member of the community would be offended if you put the material under their nose,
but if they thought it a problem if the material were available to those who wished to view it.  See
United States v. Various Articles of Obscene Merchandise, 600 F.2d 394 (2d Cir. 1979).
157. For example, a company would almost surely not be liable if a supervisor gave her subor-
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One of the virtues of this test, of particular importance after Oncale, is that it
can work as effectively for same-sex as for opposite-sex harassment.  The value
of the Abrams test is perhaps clearest if we compare it to the variety of descrip-
tive reasonableness tests as applied to the same-sex context.  Gay supervisors,
like heterosexual ones, can be guilty of quid pro quo harassment.  Gay supervi-
sors or coworkers could engage in a pattern of unwanted intimate contact or in-
trusive sexual questionings that amount to the creation of a hostile environment.
The behaviors that cross the line from legal to illegal should be the same, how-
ever, regardless of the sexual orientation of the parties.
As the court in Miller v. Vesta, Inc.158 rightly observed, the challenged be-
havior was insufficient to be construed as objectively hostile.  The court rejected
the plaintiff’s argument that “the repugnant homosexuality involved in this
case” was relevant to the severity question.159  Since the actions “were not so fre-
quent or severe, apart from their homosexual character to create a hostile envi-
ronment,”160 they were not actionable. Too often, however, fact-finders, as well
as the plaintiffs themselves, may view the defendant’s actions through lenses
colored by conscious or unconscious homophobia.  The test of “reasonableness”
should be one designed to combat, rather than facilitate, this tendency.
A problem inherent to any descriptive reasonableness standard is that the
individuals who will apply the test, judges and jurors, exist in a heterocentrist
and homophobic wider culture.161  They may all too readily see homosexual sex-
ual harassment, because it is directed against someone of the same sex, as more
disturbing than the identical conduct by a man toward a woman.  This can be
demonstrated even by those same-sex cases which were not successful, but in
which an attorney thought there was sufficient merit to initiate litigation.162  For
example, in Morgan v. Massachusetts General Hospital,163 the perpetrator stared at
dinates two unwanted hugs and a gift of candy with a note signed “Love, Steph.”  Drew v. First
Sav., 968 F. Supp. 762 (D.N.H. 1997) (dismissing case).  Likewise, it would probably not be sufficient
to claim that a supervisor commented twice a week that the plaintiff smelled nice or looked good in
his uniform. See McElroy v. TNS Mills, Inc., 953 F. Supp. 1383, 1389 (M.D. Ala. 1996) (denying mo-
tion to dismiss because allegations raised a factual question of whether the harassment was suffi-
ciently pervasive). Yet, these cases were seen as non-trivial and even potentially valid because the
actors were homosexual.  In effect, the courts allowed the plaintiff’s homophobia to color their ap-
proach.
158. 946 F. Supp. 697 (E.D. Wis. 1996).
159. Id. at 711.
160. Id. at 711-12.
161. Heterosexual men define themselves both as not women and as not gay; if they think that a
gay man finds them attractive this upsets their psychological balance.  One study indicated that
adolescent boys were more disturbed by being called gay than by such forms of harassment as
having their clothes pulled off or being forced to engage in some sexual acts. See Dolkart, supra note
146, at 163 (citing THE FOUNDATION, HOSTILE HALLWAYS: THE AMERICAN ASS’N OF UNIV. WOMEN
SURVEY ON SEXUAL HARASSMENT IN AMERICAN SCHOOLS (1993)).
162. In general, the reported same sex cases seem to involve relatively mild forms of harassment.
Courts split over whether the allegations are sufficient to withstand motions for summary judg-
ment. See, e.g., Drew v. First Sav., 968 F. Supp. 762, 765 (D.N.H. 1997) (dismissing case); McElroy, 953
F. Supp. at 1389 (allowing case to proceed).  Cases involving more egregious forms of same-sex har-
assment by allegedly gay harassers may not appear in the casebooks because defendants, recogniz-
ing how homophobic fact-finders may react, quickly settle.
163. 712 F. Supp. 242 (D. Mass. 1989).
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the plaintiff and stood behind him when he was mopping, causing the plaintiff
to bump into him.164  The plaintiff understood this as grounds for a sexual har-
assment complaint after the perpetrator asked the plaintiff to dance with him at
the Christmas party.165  In Diiorio v. Perry, the perpetrator twice stood near the
plaintiff and rubbed his own genital area, while staring at the plaintiff “to be
sure [he] was looking at him” and once commented on how little musculature
the plaintiff had.166  In Hopkins v. Baltimore Gas & Electric Co., the alleged harass-
ing incidents included telling the plaintiff he looked nice, picking up his tie and
examining the back of it, trying to kiss the plaintiff in the receiving line at plain-
tiff’s wedding and two very mild bits of sexual teasing: once he held a magnify-
ing glass over plaintiff’s crotch and asked, “where is it?” and once he pretended
to lock the door of the men’s room and said “alone at last.”167  Although none of
the plaintiffs in these cases succeeded, the facts alleged in Morgan and Diiorio are
so extraordinarily thin, with Hopkins not too far behind, as a description of hos-
tile environment that they would almost surely never have even gotten to court
had the perpetrator treated a woman in the same way.168
The heterosexual plaintiffs in these cases subjectively viewed even the
mildest forms of sexualized behavior directed toward them by same-sex gay
plaintiffs as automatically hostile and offensive. The descriptively reasonable
person, regardless of gender, is presumptively heterosexual as well.  Explicitly
or implicitly, the reasonable person may be constructed to have the same emo-
tionally charged discomfort, if not revulsion, about being the target of
(presumed) same sex sexual advances.
If, however, we must judge the severity and pervasiveness of the conduct
by the normatively reasonable standard of the Abrams test,169 there will be no
place in the doctrine for consideration of the defendant’s sexual orientation or of
the target’s homophobia.  Behaviors such as those described above cannot possi-
bly be characterized as a means of enforcing gender subordination.  They cannot
reasonably be construed as designed to, or capable of, interfering with the
plaintiff’s capacity to operate as a competent worker.  Rather, they are the same
kinds of banter and personal conversation that everyone understands as an or-
dinary part of the workplace when engaged in across the gender line.  All these
aspects of the Abrams test properly remain identical in the same-sex context.
164. See id. at 246.
165. See id. at 257.
166. No. XM-93-006, 1994 WL 741630 at *1 (EEOC Nov. 22, 1994).
167. 77 F.3d 745, 747-48 (4th Cir. 1996), cert. denied 117 S. Ct. 70 (1996).
168. Where a female plaintiff files suit based on the actions of another woman, the pattern is
similar to the homosexual male-on-male cases.  In Huddleston v. Lumbermens Mut. Cas. Co., 942 F.
Supp. 504, 507 (D. Kan. 1996), the perpetrator invited plaintiff to engage in social activities outside
the office and once had her blouse partly unbuttoned so that part of her breast was visible.  In Miller
v. Vesta, Inc., 946 F. Supp. 697, 708-09 (E.D. Wis. 1996), a coworker left the plaintiff notes, indicating
her interest in a lesbian relationship.  After plaintiff complained to management, the perpetrator
was admonished and agreed to desist.  Her only subsequent behavior was sending plaintiff a birth-
day card, allegedly following her into the restroom and “continually star[ing] at her.” Id. at 709. It is
hard to imagine the plaintiffs believing they had been subjected to objectively severe and pervasive
sexual harassment if men had engaged in similar behavior toward them.
169. See supra text accompanying notes 152-53.
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C. Was the Harassing Behavior “Unwelcome”?
The third conceptually distinct element of a sexual harassment claim is that
the challenged behavior be unwelcome.170  The EEOC Guidelines define sexual
harassment as: “Unwelcome sexual advances, requests for sexual favors, and
other verbal or physical conduct of a sexual nature” under the conditions speci-
fied in the remainder of the definition.171  The Supreme Court cited these Guide-
lines approvingly when it recognized a Title VII cause of action for sexual har-
assment in Meritor Savings Bank v. Vinson.172  It held that in determining whether
alleged conduct constitutes sexual harassment, “[t]he correct inquiry is whether
respondent by her conduct indicated that the alleged sexual advances were un-
welcome.”173  Unwelcomeness has been defined as a requirement that the plain-
tiff-employee show that she “did not solicit or incite [the conduct that she] . . .
regarded as undesirable or offensive.”174
There are two reasons for such a limitation.  First, no matter how egregious
the conduct, it is not a legally cognizable harm to a willing participant.  Imagine
that two consenting adults engage in explicit, even lurid and disgusting, sexual
behaviors at the workplace.175  While others may be offended and the company
may have a legitimate complaint about the misuse of company time and re-
sources, neither of the participants was sexually harassed.  Given the generally
relatively narrow definitions of what behaviors are sufficiently severe and per-
vasive to constitute sexual harassment, it might seem unlikely that anyone
would find them “welcome.”176  A court might, however, rule for a defendant on
the unwelcomeness issue and avoid reaching the question of severity or perva-
siveness if the former seemed a simpler question.177
170. See, e.g., Henson v. City of Dundee, 682 F.2d 897, 903 (11th Cir. 1982).
171. 29 C.F.R. § 1604.11(a) (1998) (emphasis added). The inquiry is essentially one of fact, with
relatively little doctrinal guidance.  The Guidelines go on to state that the EEOC “will look at the
record as a whole and at the totality of the circumstances, such as the nature of the sexual advances
and the context in which the alleged incidents occurred.  The determination of the legality of a par-
ticular action will be made from the facts, on a case by case basis.” 29 C.F.R. § 1604.11(b) (1998); see
also Burns v. McGregor Elec. Indus., Inc., 955 F.2d 559, 564 (8th Cir. 1992).
172. 477 U.S. 57, 62-65 (1986) (citing the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission’s Guide-
lines on Discrimination because of sex).
173. Id. at 68.  Mechelle Vinson had claimed that her supervisor’s demands for sexual favors and
other actions of a sexual nature constituted sexual harassment.  In adopting the test of unwelcome-
ness, the Court rejected the defendant’s argument that she would have to prove that “her actual
participation in sexual intercourse was voluntary.” Id.
174. Henson, 682 F.2d at 903.
175. See KENNETH STARR, THE STARR REPORT: THE OFFICIAL REPORT OF THE INDEPENDENT
COUNSEL’S INVESTIGATION OF THE PRESIDENT (1998).
176. Note also that the person who allegedly found the harassing behaviors welcome at the time
is now filing suit and necessarily claiming that they were unwelcome.  The determination of unwel-
comeness is inextricably linked to a finding that the plaintiff is not credible.
177. Insofar as the unwelcomeness requirement is about whether the plaintiff subjectively found
the behavior disturbing it can be seen as another way of stating the subjective prong of the require-
ment that the behavior be sufficiently severe or pervasive.  Under either mode of analysis the court
might conclude that this plaintiff has no claim although a reasonable person would have, had the
behavior been directed toward her.  Cf. Reichman v. Bureau of Affirmative Action, 536 F. Supp.
1149, 1164 (M.D. Pa. 1982) (rejecting sexual harassment claim without resolving the factual question
and indicating that the alleged harasser’s “actions were not undesired nor unwanted”).
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Second, the requirement of unwelcomeness can serve as a form of notice
both to the perpetrator and to the employer.  The question is not merely whether
the plaintiff subjectively found the conduct unwelcome, but whether her behav-
ior was such that an observer of her actions and reactions would understand
that she found it unwelcome.178  In effect, then, the alleged perpetrator is pro-
tected if he proceeds with caution and refrains once the target signals that his
behaviors are unwelcome.179  In this sense the unwelcomeness requirement oper-
ates in tandem with the rule that the behavior must be severe or pervasive; if it is
not severe, the target’s response can let the actor know whether repeated be-
havior will trigger liability.180  This individual notice of unwelcomeness may be
particularly important where the target/plaintiff has changed her attitude to-
wards sexual behaviors by the perpetrator.  Behavior once welcome can become
legally actionable, but courts will expect the target to indicate clearly to the per-
petrator that they are no longer welcome.181
In addition, the unwelcomeness requirement can be linked to the rules re-
garding employer liability.  Employers may legally forbid all expressions of
sexuality at the workplace; they are adequately protected under Title VII if they
effectively forbid only that conduct which is unwelcome.  Failure to take ad-
vantage of well-designed policies and procedures can reasonably lead the em-
ployer to conclude that all the employees involved find the conduct welcome
and are willing participants.182  The EEOC has stated that “[w]hen there is some
178. See generally, Paul Nicholas Monnin, Proving Welcomeness: The Admissibility of Evidence of
Sexual History in Sexual Harassment Claims Under the 1994 Amendments to the Federal Rules of Evidence
412, 48 VAND. L. REV. 1155, 1165 (1995) (citing Henson, 682 F.2d at 903 (setting forth a two-part test
for determining welcomeness)).  The doctrine has put the burden on the plaintiff to signal that the
behavior is unwelcome.  Even if she has not done anything to invite sexual advances, they may be
construed as “uninvited-but-welcome” and thus not actionable.  See Barnes v. Costle, 561 F.2d 983,
999 (D.C. Cir. 1977).
179. The extent of the necessary caution is a function of the extent to which the “objective”
prong of the unwelcomeness inquiry takes the perspective of the typical female victim or of the
typical male perpetrator, who may be oblivious to all but the most blatant signals of unwelcome-
ness.  See Fitzgerald, supra note 85, at 5-9.  But see Jeffrey Rosen, In Defense of Gender-Blindness, THE
NEW REPUBLIC, June 29, 1998 at 25, 30 (suggesting that the plaintiff should have an obligation to
communicate to the “boorish” perpetrator and thus inform him that she and other women do not
share his perception that the challenged behavior is acceptable).
180. That is, if liability hinges on repeated, relatively mild behavior (pervasiveness) rather than a
single outrageous incident (severity),  the response of the target to the earlier occasions is crucial. A
criminal sexual assault is presumed unwelcome and one such incident is sufficient. A series of hugs
and fanny pattings may also constitute sexual harassment, but not if the plaintiff consistently indi-
cated that she welcomed them.
181. See Babcock v. Frank, 729 F. Supp. 279, 288 (S.D.N.Y. 1990) (“Babcock, after ending her rela-
tionship with Musso, ‘had the right, like any other worker . . . to reject her employer’s sexual ad-
vances without threat of punishment’”) (citation omitted).  But see Evans v. Mail Handlers, 32 Fair
Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 634, 637 (D.D.C. 1983) (suggesting that the alleged harassing conduct was
not substantially unwelcome, although the sexual relationship with the alleged harasser had begun
to deteriorate at the time of the conduct that formed the basis for the suit).  The EEOC has suggested
that “particularly” where a prior consensual relationship or other behaviors may lead the alleged
harasser to believe his overtures are welcome “it is important for the victim to communicate that the
conduct is unwelcome.” EEOC Guidance, supra note 123, at 3228.
182. See Showalter v. Allison Reed Group, Inc., 767 F. Supp. 1205, 1211 (D.R.I. 1991) (“[a]n im-
portant factor in determining whether the plaintiffs welcomed the sexual advances is the availability
and practical viability of an employer’s grievance procedure”); see also Weinsheimer v. Rockwell
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indication of welcomeness . . . the charging party’s claim will be considerably
strengthened if she made a contemporaneous complaint or protest.”183
The likelihood that claims that meet the other doctrinal requirements will
fail because of the welcomeness requirement depends, of course, on how that
criteria is interpreted.  What kinds of actions by the harasser will be effectively
presumed unwelcome?  What kinds of behavior by the target will be considered
relevant to rebutting that presumption or to proving unwelcomeness where it is
not presumed?  Relevant evidence may include the plaintiff’s verbal or other re-
sponses to the challenged conduct.  It is more likely that she will be seen as wel-
coming if she responds to the harassment in ways that are seen as friendly or
sexualized or if she fails to complain to management.184
A defendant seeking to show that the challenged conduct was not unwel-
come may also be permitted to raise (and, therefore, to explore in discovery) the
plaintiff’s own use of sexualized speech,185 sexual display or sexual conduct186 on
the theory that these provide evidence of what kind of person she is and, there-
fore, how she would respond to the defendant’s conduct.  It is unclear how
wide-ranging this inquiry can be.  At its narrowest, the welcomeness inquiry fo-
cuses only on the plaintiff’s behavior vis-a-vis the harasser.187  It may be ex-
tended to include her behavior in the workplace generally,188 or behavior specifi-
cally directed towards others who are not the subject of her complaint.189  At its
Int’l Corp., 754 F. Supp. 1559, 1564 (M.D. Fla. 1990) (considering failure of plaintiff to complain spe-
cifically and promptly to management in concluding that the behavior was not unwelcome).  As
Fitzgerald notes, only a small percentage of women who experienced behavior as harassing and
unwelcome complained formally. Thus, the inference of welcomeness from failure to complain is
empirically unwarranted.  See Fitzgerald, supra note 85, at 10.
183. EEOC Guidance, supra note 123, at 3228. At least where grievance procedures are well-
designed and publicized, the lack of complaint permits the inference that the behavior was not un-
welcome.  See generally Burlington Indus., Inc. v. Ellerth, 118 S. Ct. 2257 (1998); Faragher v. City of
Boca Raton, 118 S. Ct. 2275 (1998) (allowing employers an affirmative defense to Title VII liability in
a typical hostile environment case if they have such procedures and the plaintiff unreasonably failed
to take advantage of them).
184. See, e.g., Reed v. Shepard, 939 F.2d 484, 491 (7th Cir. 1991) (finding that plaintiff had shown
“enthusiastic receptiveness to sexually suggestive jokes and activities” and that she had never com-
plained of sexual harassment);  see generally Fitzgerald, supra note 85, at 13-14; Schultz, supra note 2,
at 1730-31 (discussing Reed).
185. See Swentek v. USAIR, Inc., 830 F.2d 552, 557 (4th Cir. 1987); see also Weinsheimer, 754 F.
Supp. at 1563-64.
186. See Meritor Sav. Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 68-69 (1986) (determining that complainant’s
sexually provocative speech or dress is relevant); Burns v. McGregor Electronic Indus., Inc., 955 F.2d
559, 565 (1992) (posing for nude photos).
187. In Reichman v. Bureau of Affirmative Action, 536 F. Supp. 1149, 1164 (M.D. Pa. 1982), the court
found that the allegedly harassing behavior (a kiss), if it had occurred, would have been welcome
since the plaintiff “continued to invite [the perpetrator] to her house for dinner” even after the inci-
dent.
188. For example, in Showalter v. Allison Reed Group, Inc., 767 F. Supp. 1205, 1211-12 (D.R.I. 1991),
the court observed that the defendant urged, unsuccessfully, that the sexual advances by the super-
visor were welcome because the plaintiffs had “contributed to the general tone of sexual innuendo”
at the plant.  See id.  Sexually provocative dress would fit within this category, for example, as might
the use of vulgar language and telling of dirty jokes when these behaviors were not directed at the
harasser(s) in particular.  See, e.g., Carr v. Allison Gas Turbine Div., Gen. Motors Corp., 32 F.3d 1007,
1110-11 (7th Cir. 1994); Swentek, 830 F.2d at 556.
189. See Weiss v. Amoco Oil Co., 142 F.R.D. 311, 316 (S.D. Iowa 1992) (determining that “sexual
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broadest, it would permit examination of her sexual behavior outside the work-
place.190
In the typical male-on-female sexual harassment claim the unwelcomeness
question can deny effective legal relief in ways that are in conflict with the un-
derlying purposes of Title VII.  Quite egregious conduct may be legally con-
doned because the plaintiff first reacted by trying to ignore it or to “fit in” by
participating in trashy sex talk,191 rather than by confronting her tormentors and
risking making her situation in the workplace even more unpleasant or tenu-
ous.192  Insofar as her conduct vis-a-vis others, inside or outside the workplace, is
deemed relevant to the welcomeness inquiry, women may be deterred from
bringing even valid claims because they do not want their sexual history made a
subject of discovery193 or they fear the fact-finder may deem them “bad girls”
unentitled to the protections of Title VII.194
conduct with other employees of Defendant during her employment and of which [the perpetrator]
had knowledge” was relevant and therefore discoverable). See also Gan v. Kepro Cir. Sys., 28 Fair
Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 639, 641 (E.D.  Mo. 1982) (considering plaintiff’s sexually explicit conversa-
tions with other employees in finding the alleged harassment not actionable). But see Swentek, 830
F.2d at 562 (reversing trial court determination that conduct was not unwelcome based on plaintiff’s
foul language at the workplace, where there was no evidence the perpetrator knew of this behav-
ior).  The Swentek court concluded that “[u]nder these circumstances, it was improper for the trial
judge to suggest that Swentek’s past conduct meant that she welcomed Ludlam’s behavior.” Id.
190. See Burns, 955 F.2d at 565 (determining that evidence Plaintiff had posed for nude photos
published in a motorcycle magazine could be relevant to the unwelcomeness issue, though re-
manding because trial court had failed to consider all the evidence that Plaintiff found the behavior
unwelcome under a “totality of the circumstances” test); cf. Cronin v. United States Serv. Stations,
Inc., 809 F. Supp. 922, 932 (M.D. Ala. 1992) (rejecting relevance of plaintiff’s subjection to domestic
violence and holding that her “experiences at home have no general bearing on whether [Plaintiff]
was subjected to sexual harassment at work”).
191. See Weinsheimer v. Rockwell Int’l Corp., 754 F. Supp. 1559, 1561 (M.D. Fla. 1990).  For ex-
ample, in Weinsheimer, the alleged harassing actions by co-worker Stoner included grabbing at her
crotch and breast, frequently asking her to “suck him” or “give him head” and pointing at her
crotch and saying “give me some of that stuff,” as well as such physical violence as holding a knife
to her throat and pushing her into a filing cabinet. Id. at 1561.  The court denied her claim, however,
finding that her “willing and frequent involvement in the sexual innuendo” showed that “she did
not find the majority of such conduct” unwelcome. Id. at 1564.  As an example of her reaction, the
court noted that when Stoner asked her to “give me some of that stuff,” while pointing at her crotch,
she said “No, that’s my boyfriend’s, and it’s just like new, hardly been used.” Id.
192. Furthermore, women’s signals that they find behavior unwelcome may not be understood
by the male harasser—or by the courts. See, e.g., Antonia Abbey, Misperceptions of Friendly Behavior as
Sexual Interest: A Survey of Naturally Occurring Incidents, 11 PSYCH. WOMEN Q. 173 (1987).
193. This approach has many of the deleterious effects that an examination of the woman’s sex-
ual history had until recently in rape law. See, e.g., SUSAN ESTRICH, REAL RAPE 50-52 (1987); see also
Ann C. Juliano, Note, Did She Ask For It?: The “Unwelcome” Requirement in Sexual Harassment Cases,
77 CORNELL L. REV. 1558, 1577 (1992) (arguing that Rule 412 can provide “a basis to argue against
the introduction of prior sexual history in sexual harassment cases”); Sanchez v. Zabihi, 71 Fair
Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 835, 836 (D.N.M. 1996) (applying the policy of FED. R. EVID. 412 in entering
a protective order under FED. R. CIV. P. 26 limiting the discovery of plaintiff’s sexual and romantic
history with other co-workers).
194. See Estrich, supra note 67, at 827-28; Reed v. Shepard, 939 F.2d 484, 486 (7th Cir. 1991)
(denying the plaintiff’s claim on the grounds that the behavior was not unwelcome).  The behavior
directed toward Reed was extreme: she was handcuffed to the toilet, had her head forced into a co-
worker’s lap and had an electric cattle prod forced between her legs.  See id.  Yet the court found
that she, unlike ordinary people, was not bothered by such behavior since she “reciprocat[ed] in
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In striking contrast, heterosexual male plaintiffs bringing claims of same-
sex harassment will likely face no such barriers, although the doctrine is for-
mally identical.  First, the doctrine is likely to be applied in dissimilar ways.  Be-
havior that would be seen as ambiguous, and thus requiring evidence of unwel-
comeness, when directed toward a woman, may be seen as presumptively
unwelcome when directed toward a man, just as the concrete application of the
severity and pervasiveness test will be different when homophobia is added to
the mix. 195  Second, evidence of the plaintiff’s sexual behavior in other contexts
will likely be deemed irrelevant to the unwelcomeness query so long as it does
not raise questions about his sexual orientation.  A heterosexual male plaintiff’s
sexual banter or rough language with others at the workplace will not be consid-
ered, though it might be if the plaintiff were a woman.196  Defendants will not be
permitted to engage in discovery to determine if the plaintiff was known to be
highly (hetero)sexually active, inside or outside the workplace.  A man’s posing
nude for Playgirl would be irrelevant to whether he found the sexual advances
or homosexual sex talk of a male coworker welcome.197
Furthermore, even if the unwelcomeness doctrine were applied to hetero-
sexual male plaintiffs in precisely the same way as in opposite sex cases, it
would not have the same problematic effects.  Men are less likely to be deterred
from filing suit for fear that their high level of sexual activity will be discovered.
They are less likely to be labeled unworthy of protection by fact-finders because
of such promiscuity.
Finally, heterosexual men are likely to make their negative response to un-
wanted sexual advances by other men quite clear.  While women are socialized
kind.” Id.  The behavior by Reed which in effect immunized her coworkers comprised rough lan-
guage, exhibiting a sexual scar on her abdomen and coming to work braless. See id. at 487.  The
court either found these two sets of behavior equivalent in their offensiveness or, more plausibly,
determined that a woman who engaged in the latter could not be offended by anything. Cf. Carr v.
Allison Gas Turbine Div., Gen. Motors Corp., 32 F.3d 1007, 1011 (7th Cir. 1991) (reversing judgment
for defendant and noting that Plaintiff’s “words and conduct cannot be compared to those of the
men and used to justify their conduct and exonerate their employer”).  The EEOC has indicated that
a charging party’s use of sexual terms or off-color jokes will not be read to bar a finding that more
extreme and abusive comments or physical assaults are unwelcome. See also EEOC Guidance, supra
note 123, at 3229.
195. As Catharine MacKinnon noted, “[m]any men . . . find it credible that homosexual ad-
vances are unwanted, unsolicited, and coercive, and blame the perpetrator” while presuming, ab-
sent the clearest contrary signals,  that women find heterosexual advances welcome.  MACKINNON,
supra note 2, at 205; cf. Kinman v. Omaha Public School Dist., 94 F.3d 463 (8th Cir. 1996).  In Kinman,
a Title IX same sex sexual harassment case, the plaintiff, a high school student, had renewed and
continued her relationship with the defendant, a lesbian teacher, after Kinman’s high school gradua-
tion.  See id. at 465-66.  Nonetheless, the court found that there was sufficient evidence of unwel-
comeness, noting that Kinman, like many gay teenagers, had attempted suicide and had told her
mother that she “did not want to be gay.” Id. at 465.  The court concluded that “if Kinman’s opposi-
tion to the idea of being gay was as strong as she alleges, it is possible that any advances by a mem-
ber of her own sex would have indeed been unwelcome.” Id. at 468.  In effect, the plaintiff’s homo-
phobia becomes evidence of the unwelcomeness of any homosexual sexual conduct.
196. Compare Burns v. McGregor Elec. Indus., Inc., 955 F.2d 559, 565 and Weinsheimer, 754 F.
Supp. at 1563-64 (behavior vis-a-vis others can be relevant), with Swentek, 830 F.2d at 557 (behavior
with others, unknown to perpetrator, is not relevant).
197. Cf., Burns, 955 F.2d at 565 (nude photos of female plaintiff in Easyrider magazine “may be
relevant” to welcomeness question in a male-to-female case).
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to respond to unwanted sexuality indirectly and civilly, male socialization is
likely to lead them to respond forcefully to unwanted homosexual advances.198
Even if the response to (perceived) homosexual advances is less clear, courts will
likely construe it through a homophobic lens and thus see expressions of unwel-
comeness more clearly when the behavior is, in effect, a questioning of the
plaintiff’s heterosexual identity. 199
We thus have the rather peculiar situation that in the male-on-female cases
that are closer to the “principal evil Congress was concerned with when it en-
acted Title VII,”200 some otherwise legitimate claims may be lost or never brought
because of the operation of the unwelcomeness doctrine.  In contrast, when the
plaintiff is a heterosexual male complaining of same-sex harassment, the unwel-
comeness inquiry is likely to have as meaningless an impact as the requirement
that an individual show that they are a member of a protected class.201
III. THE IMPACT OF A SAME-SEX SEXUAL HARASSMENT CAUSE OF ACTION ON THE
GAY EMPLOYEE AND HIS EMPLOYER
Gay and lesbian employees are not protected at the national level from dis-
crimination on the basis of their sexual orientation.202  Bills designed to provide
such protection have never passed even one House of Congress.203  A substantial
198. See Koppelman, supra note 64, at 235 (asserting that heterosexual men who are the object of
sexual advances are rendered effeminate and thus degraded). The sense of attack, combined with
men’s socialization to respond forcefully will lead them to make the unwelcomeness of such per-
ceived invitations clear.  See e.g., Johnson v. Hondo Inc., 125 F.3d 408 (7th Cir. 1997) (finding that
plaintiff knocked another employee on his back during a fight and then continued to strike him with
a bat); Morgan v. Massachusetts Gen. Hosp., 712 F. Supp. 242 (D. Mass. 1989) (finding that plaintiff
hit another employee so hard he broke three bones in his face, allegedly in a reaction to the other
man staring at him and inviting him to dance at the staff Christmas party).  Others respond clearly
but without physical violence.  See, e.g., Martin v. Runyon, No. 01934718, 1994 WL 746784 (E.E.O.C.
Sept. 29, 1994) (having a strong verbal reaction to being called “bitch” and “sweetie pie”); Joyner v.
AAA Cooper Transp., 597 F. Supp. 537, 542 (M.D. Ala. 1983) (stating that “plaintiff repulsed the
terminal manager and stated that he would resign before submitting to the homosexual advances”).
But see Levit, supra note 111, at 1064 (suggesting that men are less willing to complain of sexual har-
assment and, when they do, “often face ridicule”).
199. Cf. Easton v. Crossland Mortgage Corp., 905 F. Supp. 1368 (C.D. Cal. 1995).  The plaintiff in
Easton alleged that she was the victim of sexual harassment when her female supervisor and co-
workers led discussions about female bodies, compared breasts sizes and shapes and examined each
other’s breasts and used such terms as bitch, slut and whore, which the court construed as “crass
terms of endearment.”  Id. at 1373.  The Easton court found that unwelcomeness had been shown.
Id. at 1381.  It also, however, noted that there was no claim that the defendants were lesbians, pre-
sumably assuming that the same actions might be construed as sufficiently hostile, or the plaintiff’s
response sufficient to indicate unwelcomeness, if they had been.  See id. at 1373.
200. Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Servs., Inc., 118 S. Ct. 998, 1002 (1998).
201. See, e.g., Henson v. City of Dundee, 682 F.2d 897, 903 (11th Cir. 1982).
202. Cf. Mary I. Coombs, Lowering One’s Cites: A (Sort of) Review of the University of Chicago Man-
ual of Legal Citation, 76 VA. L. REV. 1099, 1108 (1990) (discussing usefulness of citation signal “will
not see in” for statements such as this).
203. The Employment Non-Discrimination Act of 1997 would forbid employment discrimina-
tion “on the basis of sexual orientation.” See H.R. 1858, 105th Cong. (1997) and S. 869, 105th Cong.
(1997) (neither have been reported out of committee).  The Employment Non-Discrimination Act of
1996, S. 2056, 104th Cong. (1996) was introduced on the Senate floor and failed by a vote of 49-50 on
Sept. 10, 1996, during the debate on the Defense of Marriage Act.  Its introduction and near-passage,
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proportion of employees, however, do work in locations where state statutes or
local ordinances include sexual orientation among the categories as to which
discrimination in employment is forbidden.204  In theory, employers subject to
those laws cannot fire someone or refuse to hire them because of their sexual
orientation.205  Furthermore, insofar as such laws are read, like Title VII, to forbid
harassment based on any of the proscribed characteristics, gay employees would
be protected against harassment based on their sexual orientation.206
Even where employers are not legally required to provide equal treatment
to their gay and lesbian employees, they are free to do so.  They can choose to
treat sexual orientation as irrelevant to employment decisions.  They can choose
to protect their gay employees from harassment based on their sexual orienta-
tion.207  They are also, however, free not to do so.208
Employers may conclude that keeping gay and lesbian workers on their
payroll is economically disadvantageous because homophobic co-workers or
customers may prefer not to interact with gay employees.  An employer might
however, was of no more than symbolic value, since the likelihood of passage in the House at that
time (or this) was essentially zero.
204. Such laws are in effect in seven states (California, Connecticut, Massachusetts, Minnesota,
New Jersey, Vermont and Wisconsin) and the District of Columbia, plus a number of cities and
counties elsewhere, (including such large cities as Detroit, New Orleans, Tampa and Pittsburgh), so
that altogether a significant percentage of the United States population lives and works in places
subject to such protective legislation.  See Non-discrimination Law: Private Sector (last modified Oct. 9,
1995) <http://www.nyu.edu/pages/sls/gaywork/municip.html>; James W. Button et al., Where
Local Laws Prohibit Discrimination: Based on Sexual Orientation, 77 PUB. MGMT., Apr. 1995, at 9, 10.
Federal government employees are also now protected under Executive Order 13087, issued May
28, 1998. See Exec. Order No. 13,087, 63 Fed. Reg. 30,097 (1998).
205. See, e.g., CALIF. LABOR CODE § 1102.1(a)(1998) (“Sections 1101 and 1102 prohibit discrimina-
tion or different treatment in any aspect of employment or opportunity for employment based on
actual or perceived sexual orientation.”); CONN. G. S. A. § 46a-81c (1998) (“It shall be a discrimina-
tory practice in violation of this section: (1) For an employer . . . to refuse to hire or employ or to bar
or to discharge from employment any individual or to discriminate against him in compensation or
in terms, conditions or privileges of employment because of the individual’s sexual orientation”);
D.C. STAT. ch. 25, § 1-2512 (including sexual orientation among the list of characteristics as to which
an employer may not discriminate in hiring, firing, or “with respect to compensation, terms, condi-
tions, or privileges of employment”).
206. Thus, they might have a claim when the harassment was seen as based on the perpetrator’s
dislike for their homosexuality as such rather than on their gender presentation.  Cf. Dillon v. Frank,
No. 90-2290, 1992 WL 5436 (6th Cir. Jan. 15, 1992); Carreno v. IBEW Local No. 226, No. CIV.A. 89-
4083-5, 1990 WL 159199 (D. Kan. Sept. 27, 1990) (rejecting such claims under Title VII as not
“because of sex”).
207. Cf. Whitaker v. Board of Review, No. 96APE02-167, 1996 WL 362081 (Ohio App. 10 Dist.
June 25, 1996) (employee who used racist, sexist and homophobic slurs against fellow employees
was terminated for good cause, since such behavior “could disrupt, and had in the past disrupted,
the work environment”).
208. Most Americans think workplace discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation is wrong.
See, e.g., Newsweek poll indicating that 84% of Americans support equal opportunity in employ-
ment for gays and lesbians (reported in Craig W. Christensen, If Not Marriage? On Securing Gay and
Lesbian Family Values by a ‘Simulacrum of Marriage,’ 66 FORDHAM L. REV. 1699, 1723 n.144 (1998)).
Even a relatively small percentage of homophobic employers can reduce the employment opportu-
nities for gays and lesbians, however.  According to a 1987 Wall Street Journal poll, 66% of the sur-
veyed “chief executive officers of Fortune 500 companies would hesitate to promote a homosexual
employee to a management position.” Thomas Weathers, Comment, Gay Civil Rights: Are Homosexu-
als Adequately Protected From Discrimination in Housing and Employment?, 24 PAC. L.J. 541, 542 (1992).
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therefore rationally choose not to hire gays, even if the employer is not itself
homophobic.  The employer’s actions result from the logical and rational deci-
sion to maximize profits and minimize workplace problems.  Anti-
discrimination laws are designed not only to protect against the enactment of the
employer’s own prejudice,209 but also against this sort of rational response to
customer or co-worker preferences.210  Without federal protection, many em-
ployers remain legally free to respond to such prejudices against gay employees.
Even where they are formally forbidden to do so under state or local anti-
discrimination laws, not all discrimination is readily apparent.  Thus, rules that
make (forbidden) discrimination more economically rational for employers will
likely lead to more discrimination in fact.211
If the analysis in Part II is correct, the extension of Title VII to same-sex sex-
ual harassment may make the situation of gay and lesbian employees, as a
whole, even worse.  It is unclear how much it will protect them from harassment
by their heterosexual colleagues.212  Yet, it may make it relatively easy for those
same colleagues to successfully charge them with harassment.  Behaviors that
are seen as friendly banter or horseplay when done by straight men become sex-
ual harassment when done by gay men.  Behaviors that are too mild to qualify as
creating a hostile work environment when directed at women will be seen as
extremely offensive when directed at a heterosexual man.  These men, con-
sciously or subconsciously homophobic, will find such behavior unwelcome,
complain and sue.  Employers213 and legal fact-finders, sharing their view of the
world, will concur.214  Thus, gay men or lesbians, especially those in supervisory
positions, who engage in the kind of friendliness or sexual banter that would be
209. Cf. Price Waterhouse v.  Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 239 (1989) (stating that Title VII remedies
are a “simple but momentous announcement that sex, race, religion, and national origin are not
relevant to the selection, evaluation, or compensation of employees”).
210. See Fernandez v. Wynn Oil Co., 653 F.2d 1273, 1276-77 (9th Cir. 1981); Wilson v. Southwest
Airlines Co., 517 F. Supp. 292 (N.D. Tex. 1981) (holding that stereotype-linked customer preferences
cannot serve as a justification for excluding members of one sex from a job).
211. Cf. Richard A. Posner, Conservative Feminism, 1989 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 191. Judge Posner op-
poses laws that would make female employees more expensive, on average, in part because they
would “discourage employers from hiring . . . women, and there are many ways in which
[employers] can discriminate . . . without committing detectable violations of the employment-
discrimination laws.” Id. at 197.
212. Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Servs., Inc., 118 S. Ct. 998 (1998), leaves it unclear whether and
when such claims may be cognizable as a form of harassment under Title VII’s “because of . . . sex”
requirement.
213. Even an employer who is not himself homophobic might rationally decide to terminate the
alleged harasser at the first complaint, or even before the first complaint. If he is not constrained by
a law forbidding sexual orientation discrimination, he might pre-emptively avoid the problem by
not hiring openly gay people.
214. Exacerbating the problem may be a need to bend over backwards to provide equality to the
targets of gay harassment.  In Pritchett v. Sizeler Real Estate Management Co., No. CIV.A. 93-2351,
1995 WL 241855 (E.D. La. Apr. 25, 1995), the court found that the target of a gay female supervisor’s
advance had a cause of action, noting that “it seems discriminatory that a supervisor should be ex-
empt from a Title VII sexual harassment claim solely because of that supervisor’s sexual orienta-
tion . . . .To conclude that same gender harassment is not actionable . . .  is to exempt homosexuals
from the very laws that govern the workplace conduct of heterosexuals.” Id. at *1.  Accord Caldwell
v. KFC Corp., 958 F. Supp. 962, 969 (D.N.J. 1997).
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perfectly legal for anyone else, may be walking invitations to a Title VII suit.215
Sexual harassment remains a sufficiently daunting and widespread prob-
lem that it may seem perverse to worry about the negative consequences of po-
tential over-enforcement.  Most heterosexual men who (mildly) harass the
women under their supervision are still relatively safe, so long as they are oth-
erwise valuable employees.216  But the risks are unfairly and disproportionately
high for gay and lesbian employees.  For example, a lesbian assistant professor
was accused of sexual harassment by her former girlfriend, a graduate student
two years her elder.  Although the professor was ultimately exonerated, the uni-
versity did not renew her contract.217  The challenge is to reconstruct sexual har-
assment doctrine in a way that protects against this disproportionate burden on
gay and lesbian employees without eroding needed protections for all the tar-
gets of genuine sexual harassment.
IV. PROPOSED SOLUTIONS
A. The Short-Term Answer: True Equal Treatment
The legal position of gay employees under Title VII could be improved by a
commitment to applying existing doctrine and theory in a truly equal manner.
215. As Professor Schultz notes, insofar as recovery by gay men is restricted “the cases create a
biased form of justice: men who are perceived to be homosexuals are excluded from protection
against sex-based harassment,” but are unduly vulnerable to suits for such harassment.  Schultz,
supra note 2, at 1785; see also Grose, supra note 63, at 390-91 (suggesting that effect of cases is to make
expressions of homosexuality actionable while protecting expressions of homophobia and het-
erocentricity).
216. Although the number of complaints filed annually with the EEOC is little more than 15,000,
Sexual Harassment Charges, EEOC & FEPAs Combined: FY 1992 - FY 1998 , (last modified Jan., 14,
1999) <http://www.eeoc.gov/stats/harass.html>, studies indicate that the self-reported incidence
rate of sexual harassment ranges from 30-90%. See Richard C. Sorenson et al., Solving the Chronic
Problem of Sexual Harassment in the Workplace: An Empirical Study of Factors Affecting Employee Percep-
tions and Consequences of Sexual Harassment, 34 CAL. W. L. REV. 457, 458 (1998).  Thus, few incidents
lead to a formal complaint, let alone a successful one from the plaintiff’s perspective. See also United
States Merit Systems Protection Board, Sexual Harassment in the Federal Workplace (visited Nov. 1995)
<www.access.gpo.gov/mspb/image/sexhar.pdf> (only 6% of respondents to a 1994 survey of fed-
eral employees who said they had experienced sexual harassment had taken any formal action).  But
see Paci v. Rollins Leasing Corp., No. 96-295-SLR, 1997 WL 811553 (D. Del. Dec. 18, 1997).  In a case
where a man and a woman had charged each other with sexual harassment, the company fired the
man and retained the woman. The court indicated that the man, Paci, could proceed with his claim
that the company’s decision constituted gender discrimination. “Paci’s gender, which placed him in
the ‘unprotected class’ created a virtually risk-free opportunity, by firing Paci, for Rollins to avoid
any liability to Meara, who, because of her gender, was in the ‘protected class.’” Id. at *5 n.3.
217. See Philip Weiss, Don’t Even Think About It, NEW YORK TIMES MAGAZINE, May 3, 1998, at 60,
68; see also JANE GALLOP, FEMINIST ACCUSED OF SEXUAL HARASSMENT (1997) (describing extensive
university investigation of female professor based on sexual harassment charges by female graduate
students);  cf. Kracunas v. Iona College, 119 F.3d 80, 84 (2d Cir. 1997) (noting that Professor Michael
Palma, a heterosexual male, had not been subject to any adverse job consequences, despite the fact
that there had been at least five sexual harassment complaints against him prior to the lawsuit).
Sexual harassment of students by faculty in institutions of higher education, like sexual harassment
in employment is widespread and primarily male-to-female; see generally BILLIE WRIGHT DZIECH &
LINDA WEINER, THE LECHEROUS PROFESSOR: SEXUAL HARASSMENT ON CAMPUS 12-16 (2d ed. 1990);
Ronna Greff Schneider, Sexual Harassment and Higher Education, 65 TEX. L. REV. 525, 531 n. 30 (1987).
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Formal equality, blind to the different gender combinations of the parties, would
be both more consistent with the statute and generally better at protecting the
otherwise more vulnerable.218
As indicated in Part II, current case law differentiates between same-sex
and opposite-sex situations in its application of the (1) because of sex, (2) severe
and pervasive and (3) unwelcomeness criteria.  One might create equal applica-
tion on the first of these by requiring or permitting proof of the sexual orienta-
tion of the parties in opposite sex cases as well.  It would be perverse, however,
to extend this ’appalling’ discovery process to the vast majority of sexual har-
assment cases, involving male-on-female conduct.219  This would also be a huge
waste of time and effort, since the vast majority of perpetrators will be hetero-
sexual.220  Most importantly, the assumption that particular behavior is simply a
manifestation of a prior and fixed orientation is no more accurate for people de-
termined to be ‘heterosexual’ than those deemed ‘homosexual.’221
The proper equalizing move, instead, would be to treat same-sex cases in
much the way we do, or should, treat opposite-sex cases.  The question is
whether the particular behaviors can reasonably be viewed as directed toward
the plaintiff because of his/her sex or gender.  The motivations that lead the
perpetrator to act in this way toward the target may reflect sexual desire or ani-
mus or some combination of the two.  In any event, the primary focus should be
on the reasonable construction of the behavior itself, not on an attempt to deter-
mine the perpetrator’s sexual orientation.222
Determining whether a given set of actions rises to the level of ‘severe and
pervasive’ should continue to be analyzed under the common law, case-by-case
analysis which looks to the facts of a case.223  Where precedents do not provide a
determinate answer, courts should use the same measuring rod, regardless of
the gender combination or sexual orientation of the parties.224  The correct test in
218. See Doe v. City of Belleville, 119 F.3d 563, 575 (7th Cir. 1997) (suggesting that a case in-
volving male perpetrators and male plaintiffs “should not make for an entirely different analysis”);
Swage v. Inn Philadelphia and Creative Remodeling, Inc., No. CIV.A. 96-2380, 1996 WL 368316 at *3
(E.D. Pa. June 21, 1996); Calleros, supra note 61, at 63-64 (suggesting that Title VII should equally
cover all gender differentiated sexual harassment, regardless of the particular genders or sexual ori-
entations of the parties).
219. Cf. Doe, 119 F.3d at 589.
220. Even if gay men were as likely as heterosexual men to engage in sexual harassment of
women,  sources estimate that they are no more than ten percent of the population. See RICHARD A.
POSNER, SEX AND REASON 294-95 (1992).
221. A male perpetrator’s demand that a woman provide him sexual favors remains sexual har-
assment even if it could be shown that the man had a sexual fling with his summer camp bunkmate
or spoke admiringly of Tom Cruise’s body.
222. In the case of a male making sexual overtures towards a woman, a court can generally as-
sume they are done because of sex since there is ordinarily no plausible alternative explanation.  I
am thus unsure that we need a “heterosexual presumption” in such cases and making it in the case
of “offensive sexual comments . . .  or physical abuse” inappropriately conflates the more likely ex-
planation—manifestations of gender animus—with heterosexual sexual desire.  Franke, supra note 2,
at 693.
223. Male to female cases should be used, along with the limited number of existing same sex
cases.
224. Just as such a “gender-neutral” approach would be less solicitous of heterosexual men’s
homophobic responses, it would be more solicitous of the targets of heterosexual same-sex harass-
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same-sex cases is not, then, the reasonable person in the plaintiff’s position,
which too readily translates as “the ordinary heterosexual man irrationally dis-
turbed by homosexual sexuality.”  Such a test in effect provides sexual orienta-
tion discrimination protection for heterosexuals.225  Rather, the courts, in both
same-sex and different-sex cases should use a normative test, such as the
Abrams test.226
While I believe courts could apply this test without conflict with the
“reasonable person” language of Harris and Oncale, more jurisprudentially con-
servative trial judges could apply a descriptive test of reasonableness, but one
that focuses on the protection of persons vulnerable because of their gender.
Consider for a moment the impact of a formally neutral use of the reasonable
woman standard.  If a woman would not find this sexualized compliment or in-
vitation harassing coming from a heterosexual man, then it is not, as a matter of
law, severe or pervasive when issued by a gay man to another man.
A similar insistence that the law protect heterosexual men no more than it
protects women would apply to the understanding of unwelcomeness.  The un-
welcomeness doctrine is based on our assumption that sometimes sexual talk or
advances are welcome, even from coworkers or supervisors; the doctrine is de-
signed to exclude such cases from the law’s proscription.  It would be inconsis-
tent with this rule to allow a plaintiff in essence to say that because he is hetero-
sexual any sexual talk or behavior by a male perpetrator is unwelcome.  Rather,
like a woman (who is presumed to be heterosexual and therefore to find at least
some sexual talk by some men welcome), he should be expected to indicate that
particular behavior is unwelcome, unless it is of the highly invasive or degrad-
ing sort that would be presumptively unwelcome between two differently-sexed
heterosexuals.227
Such a set of rules would provide equality across lines of sexual orientation:
forbidding and permitting the same behaviors regardless of the sexual orienta-
tion of the complaining parties.  For example, if the charged conduct were that
the supervisor put an arm around a subordinate’s shoulder and emphasized
conversational points with a poke in the chest or stomach, it would only be ac-
tionable if a reasonable person would deem it severe and pervasive in a cross-
sex as well as a same-sex context.  An invitation for a drink after work would be
considered unwelcome only if the plaintiff indicated that it were—a court could
not assume that such an invitation was unwelcome if it emanated from a gay
ment.  The question whether “fuck me,” or “suck my dick” are sufficiently hostile would be decided
by a test that was not different depending on the sex of the target.  Cf. Levit, supra note 111, at 1069-
71 (critiquing courts that dismiss seriousness of such behavior when directed towards men).
225. See Abrams, Complex Female Subject, supra note 58, at 2515 (“Courts are far more sympa-
thetic to male sexual harassment claimants when they present the image of a normative, unambigu-
ously male subject who receives unexpected sexual attention from another male in the workplace.”).
226. See supra text accompanying notes 152-53.
227. In the text, I suggest that we counter-factually switch the gender of the plaintiff in asking if
the behaviors would be unwelcome.  Alternatively, we could switch the gender of the perpetrator.
The question would become whether the plaintiff would have found these behaviors unwelcome if
they were directed at him by a woman.  Would he feel harassed if a woman had engaged in equally
vulgar heterosexual sex talk?  Or if she had complimented his physique or run her fingers through
his hair or patted his bottom?  If the answer is no, then he is complaining of (unprotected) sexual
orientation discrimination, not of sex discrimination.
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man or a lesbian unless they similarly assumed it was unwelcome coming from
a heterosexual man to a woman.
Application of these rules might also facilitate a degree of empathy by men
for women’s workplace experiences.228  A man subjectively disturbed by the ho-
mosexual advances or sexual talk of another man could always complain or file
suit.  His employer, or his attorney, however, might explain to him that the be-
havior is only actionable if a woman would have found it harassing.  If hetero-
sexual men as targets must understand their experiences through a woman’s
eyes, perhaps heterosexual men as potential perpetrators can also begin to do
so.229
B. Long-term: Reconceptualizing Sexual Harassment
The ease with which the law can be and has been misused to find liability in
the case of homosexual same-sex harassment charges suggests the need for a
deeper reconceptualization.  A perpetrator (perceived as) gay engaging in sexu-
alized conduct toward a heterosexual same-sex plaintiff may too readily be de-
termined to have violated Title VII for two reasons.  First, such cases trigger ho-
mophobia in plaintiffs and fact-finders, a problem that may be dealt with in part
by the modest doctrinal changes proposed above.  Second, the case is seen as an
easy one for liability because it is so similar to the paradigmatic heterosexual lust
case.  Insofar as we explode the paradigmatic status of the heterosexual lust case,
we can remake sexual harassment law in ways that more closely track the real
harms of sexual harassment for men and women, gay and straight.230
Heterosexual and homosexual lust cases have perhaps been paradigmatic
in part because the law has been misled by linguistics.  The needed reconceptu-
alization of sexual harassment law is as follows.  Title VII forbids sex (i.e., gen-
der) discrimination, including sex-based (i.e. sexuality-based) harassment; such
harassment can, but need not, take the form of sexualized behavior; 231 sexualized
behaviors violate Title VII when, but only when, they serve as a form of gen-
dered harassment.
228. Cf. Abrams, Transformation of Workplace Norms, supra note 73, at 1202 (noting that men usu-
ally are in the role of perpetrators and have rarely been forced to understand how it feels to be on
the receiving end of sexual harassment).
229. Cf. MACKINNON, supra note 2, at 205 (“Sexual coercion from a gay male superior presents
one of the few situations in which an uninterested male employee has a chance of facing a situation
similar to that which many women employees commonly confront every day.”).
230. Although the most thoughtful critics of current sexual harassment law differ on how, pre-
cisely, to define the central harm of sexual harassment and thus the true core case, they agree that
the lust paradigm and the focus on individualized “but for” sex cases of discrimination that tend to
accompany it, are misguided. See Abrams, New Jurisprudence, supra note 9, at 1169 (claiming that the
central norm is practices that preserve male control of workplace); Franke, supra note 9 (claiming
that the central norm is harassment as a technique of policing gender); Schultz, supra note 2
(claiming that the central norm is interfering with the right of targets to be treated as competent
workers).
231. The danger of the lust paradigm is well illustrated by the reaction of one perpetrator.  A
man who had ridiculed Lois Robinson and stated that women were only fit company for something
that howls, denied her charge that he was sexually harassing her because, he explained, he hadn’t
asked her for sexual favors.  See Robinson v. Jacksonville Shipyards, Inc., 760 F. Supp. 1486, 1498
(M.D. Fla. 1991).
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Such a reconceptualization would, first, make non-sexualized gender har-
assment as obvious a basis for liability as sexualized harassment.  Consider, for
example, Delgado v. Lehman,232 in which the perpetrator “was trying to protect his
turf and . . . viewed women as threats.  He was consistently abusive towards
women, called them ‘babes,’ and used the term ‘woman’ in a derogatory man-
ner.”233  While the court agreed that this was actionable, the fact that it did not fit
the lust paradigm made it seem an extension rather than an easy, core case.234
Second, this reconceptualization would clarify that the sexualized banter that is
a normal part of many workplaces, but which is not designed to (or likely to
have) a gendered effect on employee ability to fulfill their jobs, is not a violation
of Title VII. Title VII does not impose a “general civility code” let alone a re-
quirement of grim humorlessness, on American workplaces.
An examination of current Title VII law in the same-sex context helps lead
us to this reconceptualization.  The reconceptualization, in turn, will lead us to
more coherent results, more consistent with the purposes of Title VII, in same-
sex as well as opposite-sex cases.  If the core of male-female sexual harassment is
maintaining male dominance by defining women as fundamentally sex objects
rather than competent workers, then same-sex harassment is most plausibly a
violation of Title VII when it comes closest to fitting that paradigm, rather than
the lust paradigm that currently dominates Title VII law.235  The clearest case of
actionable same-sex harassment is not the unwanted homosexual sexual invita-
tion of Dixon v. State Farm Fire and Casualty Insurance Co.,236  but the demeaning
and physically assaultive mistreatment of a man for his perceived failure of
masculinity in McWilliams.237  The targets in cases such as McWilliams, like
women, are seen as not “real workers,” because they are not “real men.”238
In contrast, lust-based harassment, whether heterosexual or homosexual, is
actionable only insofar as it can be fitted within the paradigm of gendered har-
assment. When targets are forced to endure sexual touchings or submit to sexual
232. 665 F. Supp. 460 (E.D. Va. 1987).  Appallingly, the perpetrator was one of the equal em-
ployment opportunity supervisors at the agency.
233. Id. at 468.
234. “Sexual harassment need not take the form of overt sexual advances or suggestions, but
may consist of such things as verbal abuse of women if it is sufficiently patterned to comprise a
condition and is apparently caused by the sex of the harassed employee “Id.
235. See Schultz, supra note 2, at 1688 (noting parallel of lust paradigm and sexualized vision of
gravamen of same-sex harassment).
236. 926 F. Supp. 548 (E.D. Va. 1996).
237. McWilliams v. Fairfax County Bd. of Supervisors, 72 F.3d 1191 (4th Cir. 1996); see also Esch-
bach v. County of Lehigh, No. CIV.A. 95-7276, 1997 WL 109611 at *2 (E.D. Pa. Feb. 28, 1997).  In a
female-female case “the pervasive use of derogatory and insulting terms relating to women gener-
ally and addressed to female employees personally may serve as evidence of a hostile environ-
ment.” Andrews v. City of Philadelphia, 895 F.2d 1469, 1485 (3d. Cir. 1990) (citations omitted).
238. Gay men can also engage in such same-sex gender harassment, targeting the plaintiff for his
failure to meet the perpetrator’s demands for gendered behavior and interfering with their work-
place competence. This is the best explanation for the behavior in Wrightson v. Pizza Hut of America,
Inc., 99 F.3d 138 (4th Cir. 1996), in which a group of gay men, in control of a particular workplace,
taunted the plaintiff and other young men for their heterosexuality and mockingly offered them
homosexual alternatives. See also Caldwell v. KFC Corp., 958 F. Supp. 962, 965 (D.N.J. 1997) (verbal
and physical harassment by gay male supervisor towards young heterosexual male subordinate in-
cluded “remarks degrading plaintiff’s masculinity”).
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advances as a condition of retaining their job or obtaining advancements that
they would have earned on the merits, they are being treated as sexual beings
rather than as workers.  They are being denied the respect that they are entitled
to, and would have received, if not for the harasser’s mischaracterizing their
workplace role as sexual being—a mischaracterization they suffer because they
are of a particular gender.  Such individual, lust based cases are not excluded
from the protection of Title VII.  But they are no longer central.  This shift in fo-
cus may serve as well to shift somewhat the dividing line between actionable
lust-based harassment and non-actionable sexualized workplace behaviors.239
The legal response to a claim of harassment should be unaffected by the
gender or the sexual orientation of the harasser or the target.  The question in
each case should be whether the harasser’s actions eroded the target’s ability to
work and to be seen as a worker because of the target’s gender.  That judgment
should reflect our knowledge of workplace relations and sexual relations.  But
the best case for the plaintiff should be the one where the harasser expresses
gendered contempt for the target by the use of terms like ‘bitch’ or ‘pussy,’
whether meant to insult a female target or a male one.  And the worst case
should be where the defendant expresses his or her own sexuality, for example
by describing his sexual behaviors outside work, without objectifying the plain-
tiff as a sexual object.  Neither Puritanism nor homophobia provide a basis for a
Title VII sexual harassment claim.
239. This reconceptualization of core and margin reconfirms that sexuality per se is not the gra-
vamen of the harm.  Sexual banter and physical touchings occur in many workplaces, and Title VII
is not meant to forbid them except insofar as they cause gender-differentiated harms. Where the ac-
tions are not denigrating or contemptuous, where they do not enact a form of sexuality that objecti-
fies only one sex, we should be highly skeptical of claims that such behavior violates Title VII
merely because the plaintiff is offended. Cf. Easton v. Crossland Mortgage Corp., 905 F. Supp. 1368,
1372 (C.D. Cal. 1995) (no Title VII violation where female plaintiff’s female supervisor and cowork-
ers led discussions about female bodies, and physically compared their  breast sizes and shapes).  As
some commentators have noted, subordinating, objectifying, denigrating sexual speech might be
assumed unwelcome, but explicitness itself is not forbidden, at least where it is not used strategi-
cally against a target who has made her attitude clear. See Abrams, Transformation of Workplace
Norms, supra note 73, at 1213; Dolkart, supra note 146, at 214.
